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This thesis is a history of the Boston Black United Front’s (BBUF) activities 
combatting the growing carceral state in Massachusetts in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
The BBUF was an “umbrella” organization within Boston’s Black community during the 
Black Power era and was particularly active on issues of police shootings, court 
appointments, prison reform, and street crime. This thesis examines these aspects of the 
carceral state, the network of criminal justice institutions that arose following World War II 
in Boston, and shows that the BBUF were responding to the early stages of this trend. 
Committees, rallies, and ideology were early methods utilized by the BBUF to unite their 
community. These tactics were later built upon as the group mounted an opposition to the 




Specific rallying points for the BBUF were four police shootings of unarmed Black men, 
judicial appointments, prison reform, and BBUF street patrols in the South End, Roxbury, 
Dorchester, and Mattapan neighborhoods. In the end, the BBUF saw some success, but failed 
to prevent the carceral state’s growth. Their history, however, dispels many long-held 
assumptions about Black communities and the carceral state and adds a unique perspective to 
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The confluence of urban renewal, economic decline, demographic change, and racism 
in Boston led to an increasing reliance on punitive solutions for the problems of poverty in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Black Bostonians bore the brunt of this carceral transformation, and 
continue to do so today. Finding little relief in established white institutions at the beginning 
of this carceral turn, the Boston Black United Front (BBUF) organized a years-long, 
community-based response. This thesis examines that response and reveals that Boston’s 
Black population were significantly impacted by the growing carceral state. 
As an idea, the BBUF emerged after Stokely Carmichael’s December 1967 speech at 
the Roxbury YMCA, in which he urged Black communities across America to form united 
fronts in their communities to counter the coming backlash against the civil rights 
movement.1 Many local organizers who had participated in previous social movements in 
Boston began meeting shortly after Carmichael’s speech to discuss his concept, but it 
remained largely that—a concept—until the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in 
April 1968. As in many Black communities across America, Dr. King’s killing jolted 
Boston’s Black activists to organize in the fashion Carmichael had advocated. Their efforts 
found a ready willingness among even the more traditional elements of the community to 
                                                          
1 Chuck Turner, interview by Carly Caroli, March 2016, Boston, MA. 
2 
coordinate on self-defense, policing, economic development, education, housing, and 
politics.2 The BBUF was created as a result. A self-described “umbrella organization” of 
individuals and organizations, the BBUF was formed by activists and everyday residents who 
found common cause through the BBUF’s work despite ideological divisions.3
While Carmichael’s speech and Dr. King’s assassination galvanized the formation of 
the BBUF, national figures and events should not obscure the vibrancy that already existed 
among Boston’s Black activists in the 1960s. School reform had already spurred a great deal 
of action, including the “Stay Out for Freedom” protests of 1963, which saw thousands of 
students temporarily refuse to attend classes to draw attention to the abysmal condition of the 
public schools that Black students attended. Housing was likewise an issue that saw a great 
deal of Black activism throughout the 1960s with groups like the Community Assembly for a 
United South End (CAUSE) pressuring the city and construction companies for more equity 
in urban development.4 On the economic front, 1963 saw activists organizing boycotts of 
businesses that were known to discriminate against African Americans. These actions 
delivered concrete gains in some cases—job offers to members of the Black community—
and raised general awareness of the obstacles that Black Bostonians faced.  
Protests for economic justice coincided with police brutality in what became known 
in the Black community as the Police Riots during the summer of 1967. The impetus for 
these violent confrontations were demonstrations by Mothers for Adequate Welfare (MAW). 
2 Mel King, Chain of Change (Boston: South End Press, 1981): 101-110. 
3 “Statement of Purpose,” Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front, n.d. SC1, Box 1. Roxbury Community 
College Library Special Collections. 
4 King, Chain, 30-78. 
3 
 
Having agitated peacefully since 1965 for welfare reform, MAW began a nonviolent sit-in at 
the Welfare Department in Roxbury. On the second day of protests, however, things took a 
violent turn. Demonstrators were attacked by police attempting to break up the gathering. 
This violence then spilled over into looting and arson in the commercial areas of Blue Hill 
Avenue.5 Chuck Turner, later a co-chairman of the BBUF, was deeply involved in organizing 
MAW.6 The violent response of police to peaceful demands for social and economic justice 
would inform his and other members of the BBUF’s views as they confronted similar 
iniquities in coming years. As both MAW actions and Turner’s involvement show, the 
formation of the BBUF did not happen sui generis. Instead, the organization’s founding was 
the culmination of national and local events, and the next phase of a robust activist 
community already at work in Boston. 
As this thesis examines the BBUF’s actions, impact, and legacy, six key insights 
emerge. One is that both the carceral state and street crime were concerns for Boston’s Black 
community in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Historians have often posited that these two 
trends were mutually exclusive or that the latter caused the former. The history of the BBUF 
shows that it was possible to be concerned with both. BBUF leadership saw the 
interrelationship between the two, but did not assume more policing and prisons would solve 
crimes driven by poverty. This awareness among BBUF activists also demonstrates the Black 
community’s historical agency on matters of criminal justice, another area sorely missing in 
much of the literature. 
                                                          
5 Jim Vrabel, A People’s History of the New Boston, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2014): 81-
91. 
6 King, Chain, 57-9. 
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A second insight that this thesis reveals is the degree of community cohesion present 
among members of Boston’s Black community during the BBUF era. Several decades of 
community activism and shared lived experiences led them to find common cause against the 
burgeoning carceral state. Without cohesion from these historical elements, an organization 
would have struggled to be effective. The degree of community cohesion exhibited also 
speaks to the ongoing and long-term effects of racist policing and punitive policies against a 
targeted segment of the population. Living in a community under threat of violence from 
those who were in charge of safety had a powerful effect on group identity and self-reliance. 
Third is the inextricable relationship between racism and economics, and the ways 
this connection affects policing, incarceration, and crime. Boston’s Black community was 
targeted for control through the carceral state more than other communities because of a 
history of racist economic exclusion. A vicious cycle of racism and impoverishment fed on 
itself, and in the late 1960s a punitive solution to this poverty replaced the state’s former 
focus on welfare. 
A fourth insight uncovered by this thesis is the degree to which the BBUF’s media-
based activities prefigured much of the online activism of today. The BBUF were savvy 
users of newspapers, rallies, posters, and other forms of communication that mirrored ways 
racial justice activists use today’s media landscape. The BBUF’s tactics in this area, like 
those of individuals and organizations working on similar issues today, raise important 
questions about the ethical limits of using various media for a cause. For one, do 
marginalized groups have a right to communicate messages not sanctioned by mainstream 
power brokers? If so, how far can they take their alternative views? Even if one agrees with a 
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group’s overall challenge to the status quo, the means by which that challenge is put forth 
may not be considered ethical by all.  
Fifth, this thesis shows the degree to which the BBUF was willing to pursue different 
avenues simultaneously to affect change. Often, the group attempted to work with city and 
state power holders while at the same time attempting to deal with issues of policing, courts, 
prisons, and crime themselves. Many Black Power groups of the time were seen as hostile to 
authority, whereas the BBUF was not. The BBUF did not neatly fit into the Black Power 
movement, even though it was formed during the Black Power era and adopted much of its 
rhetoric. 
A sixth and final insight apparent in this thesis is that the BBUF understood the 
systemic nature of the carceral state. BBUF leaders made connections between economics, 
crime, racism, policing, urban renewal, incarceration, government, and community. These 
are interrelated facets of the carceral state that many scholars and much of the public did not 
understand until recently. For BBUF activists, reform of one of these components of the 
carceral state alone would not yield a new relationship with the state for Black Bostonians. 
Rather, comprehensive changes were needed. The BBUF offered a community-centered 
alternative model as a potential replacement for the carceral state. Ultimately, as compelling 
as the BBUF vision was for many Black Bostonians, it failed to prevent mass incarceration, 
police brutality, and other manifestations of the carceral state. Their failure demonstrates the 
limitations of community-based actions against systemic social problems. 
After a year in which Black Lives Matter (BLM) protesters marched on state houses 
across the nation, the legacy of the BBUF and its efforts to radically reform the criminal 
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justice system have never been more relevant. Just as the BBUF marched, issued demands to 
city officials, investigated police brutality, and took criminal justice into their own hands in a 
variety of ways, today’s BLM activists are similarly challenging the foundations of the 
carceral state by demanding police, prison, and social reform. 
At the same time, significant differences of scale, urban racial diversity, and legacies 
of Black activism separate the BBUF and BLM challenges to the carceral state. When the 
BBUF began its attempts to find justice for Black Bostonians in the late 1960s, the carceral 
state was in its infancy, with mass incarceration rates and federal spending on policing just 
beginning to grow. In contrast, BLM activists are now seeking to reform or abolish a system 
that has had fifty years to mature and now employs hundreds of thousands, imprisons 
millions, and has supporters across the political spectrum and throughout legislatures across 
the nation.7 Cities today are also more diverse than they were during the earlier period and so 
racial justice protesters and activists come from more diverse backgrounds.  
While these differences are significant, they do not detract from the historical 
importance of understanding the successes and failures of the BBUF. Balancing cooperation 
and resistance with the carceral state, use of various media to promote movements for justice, 
and uniting local communities behind a cause are all as relevant today as they were then. 
Indeed, the legacy of the BBUF is only becoming more important in the third decade of the 
twenty-first century and therefore it demands a robust historical accounting. 
                                                          
7 Wendy Sawyer and Peter Wagner, “Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020,” Prison Policy Initiative, Press 
Release, March 24, 2020. https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html. 
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The second chapter of this thesis explores the historical context of the BBUF and puts 
an emerging historical literature on the origins of the carceral state in conversation with 
urban histories of Boston. Economic decline, urban renewal, the Second Great Migration, 
and racism are explored as the forces that led to the growth of Boston’s carceral state. Social 
movements within Boston’s African American community are also examined as a source of 
historical precedent for the BBUF. Finally, the second chapter connects the African 
American history of Boston to the BBUF’s rhetorical and operational responses to the 
carceral state. The third chapter explores BBUF concepts, organizing tactics, ideology, and 
rallies that incorporated the rhetoric and operations discussed in chapter two. The fourth 
chapter examines BBUF actions on police shootings, court reform, prison reform, and 
community security, connecting the historical context of chapter two with the actions and 
rhetoric of chapter three. In chapter five, the conclusion, the thesis draws together all of the 
elements from preceding chapters to offer insights into the historical relevance of the 










THE GROWTH OF THE CARCERAL STATE IN MASSACHUSETTS 
 
 
After World War II, urban areas across the United States saw changes in the 
relationships between Black communities and the collection of criminal justice institutions 
known as the carceral state. Restructuring of capital, urban renewal projects, the Second 
Great Migration, and racism all shaped an urban landscape in which the state increasingly 
looked to punitive solutions for the problems associated with poverty. Over the past decade, 
historians have analyzed how today’s carceral state took shape both in national policies and 
particular cities, like New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. 
In Boston, where the Black community accounted for less than ten percent of the 
population prior to the 1960s, capital restructuring and urban renewal did not initially target 
Black Bostonians to the degree they did in other cities. However, as Boston’s Black 
population doubled and thousands of white Bostonians left the city over the course of that 
decade, the effects of the carceral state grew. Incidents of police brutality, unfair sentencing 
in the courts, a growing prison population, and declining safety in Black neighborhoods were 
becoming a regular part of life in the South End, Roxbury, Dorchester, and Mattapan.  
While Boston had a long history of Black activism prior to the late 1960s, no 
organization directly or systematically addressed the effects of the carceral state in the Black 
community until the BBUF was formed in 1968. Perceiving the interrelated nature of urban 
decline, the criminal justice system, and racism, the BBUF protested, sought reforms where 
9 
possible, developed rhetoric rooted in Black Power, and served as a surrogate local 
government when the city of Boston failed to justly serve its Black residents. 
The historical context in which the BBUF arose was shaped by the societal changes 
that took place in the 1950s and 1960s. In response to these changes, policymakers and 
politicians began to rely on policing and incarceration rather than social supports for the most 
vulnerable citizens. In this context, the BBUF’s criminal justice work shows that a lack of 
jobs, education, housing, and healthcare for Boston’s Black community were the drivers of 
poverty and crime, and that a punitive solution would not solve the underlying issues. The 
organizational capacities of the BBUF were developed with these concerns in mind and 
unleashed in response to over-policing, declining safety, and increasing entanglements for 
Black Bostonians with Massachusetts’ carceral apparatus. 
Evidence of the effects of the carceral trend on Boston’s Black community is 
nowhere more apparent than in the rates of incarceration for various racial groups in 
Massachusetts. While contact with police officers is the likeliest point in the carceral system 
for violence, prisons are the point at which the failures of the justice system to protect all 
citizens truly come to light. By the end of the 1970s, Massachusetts was imprisoning African 
Americans at approximately six times the rate of whites, a ratio that remains intact today.8 
There were increases in this ratio during the 1980s and 1990s, but the overall point is that 
Black citizens in Massachusetts were and are imprisoned in vastly disproportionate numbers 
compared to white residents.  
Another indicator of the power of the carceral state in Boston is the budget of the 
Boston Police Department (BPD) compared to other city departments. The force’s fiscal year 




2020-2021 budget was $414,182,025. That amount is ten times larger than the library budget, 
fifteen times larger than the budget for neighborhood development and one-hundred eighty-
two times larger than the budget for the arts.9 Today’s carceral conditions began in the urban 
changes that occurred in the postwar period and led to a punitive shift in the state. The 
BBUF’s anti-carceral state activities were the Black community’s early answer. 
Economic Decline in Boston, 1945-1980 
 Boston, like other urban areas of New England, experienced an industrial and 
economic decline during the Great Depression and that continued apace following World 
War II. Key industries like leather and footwear moved out of the region while shipyards 
closed. The end of the war economy also had an impact, with the cancellation of war 
contracts and the ensuing decline in the machinery and tooling industries. Within the city 
limits of Boston, the overall decline was exacerbated by the movement of capital and jobs 
from the inner city to the suburbs. The burgeoning electronics industry, in particular, grew 
along the Route 128 corridor rather than in the heart of the city.10 This sent the city into a 
spiral where city income declined while taxes were raised, further incentivizing businesses to 
leave for cheaper locations.  
By the early 1950s, many white Bostonians were abandoning the inner city for the 
jobs and housing that were available in the suburbs, leaving city structures to deteriorate.11 
Boston's economic situation affected working-class communities across the city, but by the 
1960s, continuing economic restructuring and suburbanization disproportionately touched 
                                                          
9 Lauren Chambers, “Unpacking the Boston Police Budget,” American Civil Liberties Union Massachusetts, 
https://data.aclum.org/2020/06/05/unpacking-the-boston-police-budget/.  
10 Thomas H. O’Connor, Building a New Boston: Politics and Urban Renewal, 1950-1970 (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1993), 19. 
11 O’Connor, 72-3. 
11 
Black residents. Populating a significant portion of the low-wage sector of the workforce, 
they were particularly subject to changes in the prevailing economic winds.12 
Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s analysis of postwar California in Golden Gulag provides a 
useful framework for understanding the impact these economic changes had on Boston and 
the carceral turn that most affected its Black citizens. While the two economies had 
similarities and differences, the effects of the changes fueled a carceral approach to poverty 
in both cases. Crucial to Gilmore’s theoretical framework is what the author outlines as the 
shift from the Keynesian welfare state to a much less forgiving form of capitalism. This 
change is described as one from the “welfare-warfare” state to the “workfare-warfare” state, 
where, as care for the most vulnerable members of society devolved from federal to state 
governments, the latter turned toward policing and incarceration as the remedy for the 
declining economic prospects under the post-Keynesian economic outlook.13  
Boston, like parts of California, saw war industry contracts dry up in the 1950s, and 
with them, industrial jobs. The movement of business and middle-class taxpayers in Boston 
from the inner city to the suburbs likewise mirrored the disruptive effects that capital had in 
California. By the late 1960s, the retreat of the federal government’s welfare initiatives 
devolved responsibility for the most vulnerable to Massachusetts and Boston. For the city, 
the solution for these problems became growing the carceral state.14 
Gilmore’s work helped launch the carceral perspective in historical studies from 
which this thesis draws its analytical framing. Other scholars have built on this foundation to 
12 Anne Gray Fischer, “’The Place is Gone!’: Policing Black Women to Redevelop Downtown Boston,” 
Journal of Social History 53, no. 1 (2019): 11. 
13 Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California 
(California: University of California Press, 2007), 30-86. 
14 On the defense industry and suburbanization in Boston see O’Connor; on the decline of welfare in Boston see 
Fischer; on the lack of economic opportunity for Black Bostonians see Mel King. 
12 
add more complexity to the framework. John Clegg and Adaner Usmani argue against 
overemphasizing race in the causes of mass incarceration in favor of economics. In 
developing this argument, the authors first point to a statistical jump in violent crime in the 
1960s. Clegg and Usmani then draw attention to the weakness of the American working-class 
as a political bloc, arguing that as a result necessary resources were not adequately 
redistributed from the top of the economic hierarchy to the bottom, provoking local 
authorities into taking a punitive approach to a rise in crime in poor communities. Thus, the 
turn toward punishment, rather than social reform, was the result of economic forces and the 
weakness of the American welfare state. To bolster their argument, Clegg and Usmani draw 
from economics, education, and public opinion statistics to demonstrate these historical 
trends.15 
In a rebuttal called “Materializing Race: On Capitalism and Mass Incarceration,” Jack 
Norton and David Stein argue that Clegg and Usmani overemphasized and oversimplified the 
connections between a hypothetically stronger United States welfare state and a smaller 
carceral state. Norton and Stein do not disagree that unfettered capitalism has contributed to 
the rapid growth of mass incarceration in the United States, but argue that race is integral to 
understanding class and economics. It cannot be disaggregated and posited as a secondary 
cause. Crime, too, in Norton and Stein’s refutation is integrated with economics and race, and 
should not to be dismissed or overemphasized in any analysis.16 The authors of 
“Materializing Race” argue for an intersectional analysis of the carceral state that 
incorporates race, class, and other aspects of society rather than the distillation of a particular 
15 John Clegg and Adaner Usmani, “The Economic Origins of Mass Incarceration,” Catalyst 3, no. 3 (Fall 
2019), https://catalyst-journal.com/vol3/no3/the-economic-origins-of-mass-incarceration. 
16 Jack Norton and David Stein, “Materializing Race: On Capitalism and Mass Incarceration,” Spectre 1, no. 2 
(Fall 2020), https://spectrejournal.com/issues-index/.  
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component of society like economics alone. This is not so much a complete refutation of 
Clegg and Usmani’s view as a case for a richer, more complex analysis of the carceral state. 
Unlike Clegg and Usmani or Norton and Stein, Elizabeth Hinton’s book, From the 
War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America, traces 
the history of mass incarceration to the political environment born of the Great Society. In 
Hinton’s assessment, mass incarceration was, perversely, the byproduct of the growth of the 
welfare state and a reaction to the civil rights movement. The same progressive reformers 
who sought to end racial discrimination and poverty also tied crime prevention into their 
program. Major aspects of this shift, according to Hinton, were the growth of “scientific” 
approaches to criminal behavior and increased funding from the federal government. These 
approaches were ultimately flawed to begin with as they overemphasized crime in African 
American neighborhoods, further reinforcing the surveillance, detention, segregation, and 
impoverishment of Black citizens.17 Hinton’s analysis recognizes the significant role the 
federal government played in the early days of the carceral state in a manner that differs from 
Gilmore. The War on Poverty and ensuing federal policies certainly played a role in shaping 
policing in the 1960s and 1970s, but, like economics, do not entirely explain the changes that 
occurred. Rather, the federal government helped shape capital’s shift away from inner cities, 
and the increased support for policing was a byproduct of the earlier swing away from 
Keynesianism. 
Economic decline in Boston in the postwar period and its disproportionate effects on 
African Americans defines part of the historical landscape of the BBUF. Poverty was a 
concern for the organization, but the response by the state to the effects of poverty was even 
                                                          
17 Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in 
America, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016). 
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more important. As increased policing and incarceration were favored as methods to control 
the poor, the BBUF connected the injustices of poverty and this type of state intervention. At 
the same time, the BBUF also sought to combat the increased crime within the Black 
community that resulted from a lack of economic opportunity. Economics acted together 
with urban renewal, demographic change, and racism, but was not far from the minds of the 
BBUF leadership as they confronted the issues presented by the carceral state.   
Urban Renewal in Boston, 1950-1970s 
 In his inaugural speech as mayor on January 2, 1950, John Hynes promised to create 
a “New Boston.” His plan, in part, would utilize slum clearance with the aid of federal 
funding. Hynes’ tenure kicked off a new era in which the machine politics of Mayor James 
Michael Curley gave way to a business-friendly administration. The physical transformation 
of the city promised economic revitalization to the bankers and business leaders that Hynes 
courted. 
Intertwined with the business interests now dominating City Hall in the 1950s was the 
designation of “blight” given to particular areas of the city by local banks. This policy, 
known as redlining, caused significant political and economic damage to these 
neighborhoods. Redlining, as historians define it today, began in the 1930s when the Home 
Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) commissioned local real estate boards to produce color-
coded maps of cities to determine their desirability for investment. Systemic disinvestment, 
beginning in the 1930s, eventually rendered whole neighborhoods fit for the wrecking ball, a 
process of state-sponsored redevelopment that opened them to private capital.  
Dominated by white men, Boston’s banks considered the areas with the greatest 
numbers of Black residents like the South End, Dorchester, and Roxbury to be the most 
15 
 
blighted. But Black neighborhoods were considered blighted only because they did not have 
the businesses or upper-class populations that banks wanted in order to justify investment. 
This then became a self-fulfilling prophecy in which middle class people moved outside of 
the city for lower mortgage rates and jobs, further impoverishing those neighborhoods that 
actually needed investment the most. City services suffered, as well, which left garbage on 
the streets and led infrastructure to decline. Even downtown Boston by the 1950s was 
considered a blighted area by many of these banks.  
Slum clearance and the remaking of “blighted” areas would provide an opening for 
business investment in Boston, but at a cost to the most marginalized residents in the city. 
The West End and New York Streets areas were two sections of Boston that saw radical 
redevelopment as part of this process.18 The former was a mostly white area and the latter 
more racially mixed. Urban renewal in Boston demonstrated an indifference and hostility to 
working class communities as their neighborhoods were selected to be cleared and rebuilt. 
Boston’s small, tight-knit Black community avoided the comprehensive 
neighborhood clearance that residents faced in the mostly white West End. Nonetheless, by 
the 1960s, Black Bostonians were increasingly feeling the effects of urban renewal. As their 
population in Boston doubled over the course of a mere decade, it did so in a city that had 
eliminated thousands of units of housing for working-class residents. In Roxbury, the heart of 
the Black community, clearance projects had begun for two highways, the Inner Belt and the 
Southwest Expressway.19 Neither one was ultimately built, in part, because of a coalition of 
activists that included the BBUF. Boston’s integrated South End was spared total clearance, 
                                                          
18 O’Connor, Building, 39-224. 
19 Karilyn Crockett, People Before Highways: Boston Activists, Urban Planners, and a New Movement for City 
Making (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2018), 164-95. 
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however, redevelopment projects there still brought struggles for Black community leaders to 
rally against, including BBUF stalwart Mel King. Leaders like King demanded community-
controlled affordable housing rather than the middle-income redevelopment that targeted the 
white professional class.20 
By the 1960s, despite the Black community’s efforts, redevelopment in Boston 
shifted from slum clearance to subsidizing and encouraging private investment, driving the 
newly diagnosed problem of gentrification. This process replaced Black South Enders with 
an influx of white newcomers. Many longtime residents of that neighborhood were forced to 
move into more cramped and less desirable parts of Roxbury.21 At the same time, the 
professionals who gentrified formerly Black neighborhoods demanded an increased police 
presence in the name of safety. In this way, displacement was the first step, followed by more 
policing. 
Another effect of urban renewal was to empower white enclaves, often at the expense 
of Black residents. The urban renewal that also affected white ethnic neighborhoods in 
Boston led residents of those neighborhoods to organize politically and for their own 
interests. This shifted divisions within city politics from ones of religion and ethnicity to 
those of race and class. The declining support from the federal government for welfare 
programs (beginning in the late 1960s) exacerbated this situation, putting white and Black 
groups at odds over state and city services.22  
Increased policing and incarceration were then grafted onto this already volatile 
situation. As Gilmore observes, by the late 1960s, the decline in federal support for inner city 
                                                          
20 Vrabel, People’s History, 101-11.  
21 Vrabel, 110. 
22 O’Connor, Building, 290-6 and King, Chain, 64-78. 
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populations left states and municipalities to deal with the problems of poverty. Business 
interests, too, wanted slum clearance, an end to blight, and the perception that their newly 
renewed neighborhoods would not have the type of people that would make them undesirable 
to professionals and other moneyed buyers.  
Anne Gray Fischer in “’The Place is Gone!’” illuminates the causal relationship 
between the over-policing of Black Bostonians—particularly Black women—and the mid-
century urban renewal project. The author’s work demonstrates that African Americans in 
downtown Boston’s red-light district, colloquially known as the Combat Zone—an area that 
emerged when the “old” red light district, Scollay Square, was cleared for urban renewal—
were disproportionately targeted by the police in order to make the area more amenable to 
white capital interests that were developing the area.23 The connections made by Fischer 
between capital, urban renewal, policing, and racism demonstrate that these were all 
interrelated forces that converged on Boston’s African Americans more than other groups. 
While the author’s focus is on Black women in particular, the BBUF’s activism around 
police shootings, courts, prisons, and neighborhood safety supplement what Fischer found to 
be an increasing part of the Black experience in Boston in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Arnold Hirsch’s Making the Second Ghetto analyzes the effects of urban renewal on 
postwar Chicago, but nonetheless points out similar dynamics to those that were occurring in 
Boston. White flight to the suburbs, an expansion of Chicago’s Black population, and urban 
renewal both expanded and further impoverished the “ghetto,” the segregated section of 
Chicago where the city’s Black population lived. Urban economic decline was met with 
reactions from both business interests and lower-class white populations. The former drove 
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urban redevelopment projects to clear slums and invest capital while the latter group rioted 
and attacked Black Chicagoans over and over again from the 1940s to the 1960s. In Hirsch’s 
telling, “the process of reconstruction, which saw blacks treated as objects rather than as 
participants, revealed their powerlessness.”24  
So too were Boston’s Black residents marginalized by economic decline followed by 
redevelopment along racial lines. Most famously, these tensions erupted into the anti-busing 
movement in 1970s Boston, but historians have made connections between the earlier 
changes wrought by urban renewal and the later fight to protect white neighborhoods.25 To 
working-class white Bostonians, economic restructuring had only benefited elites and urban 
renewal had robbed them of their neighborhoods. The racism and interethnic friction that led 
white Bostonians to violently reject busing—itself driven by economic decline and urban 
renewal—likewise contributed to the escalating role the carceral state played in the lives of 
Boston’s Black community. 
The Second Great Migration and Urban Change in Boston, 1960s 
 Over the course of the 1960s Boston underwent drastic demographic changes. Much 
of that change came from those who left the South as part of the Second Great Migration. 
Still underway in the 1960s, this growth in Boston’s Black population, combined with 
economic decline, urban renewal, and racism, made their community a more significant 
target for increased policing and incarceration. In a 1961 report published by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of the Census, African Americans only comprised 9.06 
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percent of the population of Boston.26 By 1971, African Americans’ share of the city’s 
population had grown to 18.15 percent.27 Coupled with this increase was a decline in the 
city’s overall white population from 90.2 percent to 81.8 percent.28 These local trends—
growing African American populations and declining white ones—were indicative of larger 
national trends for urban areas. Many African Americans moved to northern cities from the 
South for jobs and greater freedom, while white urban residents fled to the suburbs in what 
was deemed “white flight.”29 Boston was no different and these major population shifts 
would contribute to the shape of activism in the 1960s and 1970s. 
From one perspective, Black citizens’ control at the municipal level due to the rapid 
growth of their population and the decline of Boston’s white population could have provided 
a larger bloc upon which political and economic power could be built. Boston had seen such 
enlargements in power by ethnic groups in earlier eras, most notably by the Irish during the 
reign of Mayor James Michael Curley.30 If progress for certain ethnic groups was built upon 
taking control of City Hall, many in the 1960s thought perhaps it was African Americans’ 
turn. From another perspective, Boston’s demographic shift in the 1960s was relatively small 
compared to those taking place in other northern cities. While potentially hindering the 
seizure of political power, this fact also allowed for greater community cohesion and would 
have made the formation of a group like the BBUF somewhat easier. 
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 While a larger stake in politics looked possible, and a tight knit community allowed 
for activism and cohesion, the relative growth in their population, coupled with changing city 
economics, development, and ever-present racism, made African Americans the primary 
target of Massachusetts’ growing carceral state. Historian Simon Balto, in Occupied 
Territory, makes the connection between the Second Great Migration, white anxiety, and 
increased policing in Chicago during the same period.31 Similar forces would play out in 
Boston during the 1960s and manifest themselves in police violence and increased 
incarceration for Black Bostonians. As economics and urban renewal restructured Boston’s 
social order, lower class white residents looked to the police to reinforce white supremacy, 
while wealthier interests wanted the growing population kept out of neighborhoods they 
deemed worthy of investment.  Police brutality toward Black citizens and the indifference to 
the violence in the courts and government were aspects of this process. 
Anne Fischer’s work on the treatment of Black women by police and courts in 
downtown Boston is especially illustrative of this phenomenon. Black women working as 
prostitutes were deemed unfit to live and work in downtown Boston, and were arrested while 
white sex workers were not. Upon appearing before a judge, the women were offered the 
chance to leave town instead of being sent to prison.32 This example directly demonstrates 
the carceral state’s attempts to dislocate Black residents from Boston, but this dynamic 
played out daily in less conspicuous ways as members of the Black community were 
brutalized and harassed by police, subjected to unfair sentencing, imprisoned, and themselves 
made victims of crime. From a wider perspective, the growth in Boston’s Black population 
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meant that they would be increasingly targeted by the police because the white power 
structure saw them as a hinderance to its economic and social plans. 
Racism Among Police and Other Power Brokers in the Carceral System  
Seminal to the discussion of race’s role in the carceral state, Michelle Alexander’s 
2012 book The New Jim Crow argues that a racial caste system currently exists in the United 
States and that this system is perpetuated through mass incarceration, a form of social 
control. Alexander traces the origins of mass incarceration to the War on Drugs of the 1980s 
while recognizing that the current system of control over African Americans also has roots in 
the original Jim Crow laws and slavery. Ultimately, this system, according to Alexander, has 
led to the marginalization of a vast underclass—composed primarily of African American 
men—who are locked out of mainstream society as well as the American economy.33 The 
New Jim Crow’s focus on the explanatory power of race is relevant to the changes that 
occurred in postwar Boston and contributed to the growth of the carceral state in 
Massachusetts, but alone does not explain them. Coupled with economics, urban renewal, 
and demographic change, however, racism did play a significant role in creating and 
reinforcing the challenges foisted upon Boston’s Black community. 
Balto points out racism as a significant factor in Boston’s police force in a larger 
discussion of police attitudes toward African Americans in urban areas during the 1960s. In a 
study he cites, seventy-two percent of white police officers expressed highly prejudiced or 
“anti-Negro” attitudes. Black officers were not immune either. The same study found that 
eighteen percent of Black officers showed “disdain for Black people.”34 Racism obviously 
ran high in the BPD and elsewhere. This meant that as Boston’s Black community was 
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economically and socially marginalized, and as policing was turned to by the state to control 
and dislocate the same population, the Black community would be confronted by armed 
officers harboring racist agendas. Racism surely contributed to the willingness of police to 
use deadly force with Black Bostonians, leading to the string of police shootings the BBUF 
would confront in the early 1970s. Judges, guards, and wardens also harbored racist 
sentiments that drove them to treat Black defendants and prisoners more harshly than their 
white counterparts. 
While the racism endemic in the BPD and the Massachusetts criminal justice system 
certainly had an insidious effect on the Black community, it was not explicit state or 
municipal policy that African Americans were to be treated differently from other citizens 
within the carceral state. Rather, it was the aggregate racism of individuals who exercised 
power over the most vulnerable that perpetuated the system. Hirsch describes the racist 
motivations behind the rioters who attacked Black neighborhoods in Chicago and the police 
who abetted them as failures of individuals. Police officials as well as patrolmen sympathized 
with the white mobs who terrorized African Americans in Chicago from the 1940s through 
the 1960s.35  
In Boston, too, the failures were by individual police officers, judges, or prison 
personnel. This does not mean that racism was not systemic in 1960s or 1970s Boston, but 
that there were many points within the criminal justice system in which individuals made 
decisions driven by race. The impunity with which these decisions were made and their 
aggregate effects on Boston’s Black community were what made them systemic. The string 
of police shootings of unarmed Black men that rocked Boston’s Black community in the 
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early 1970s in particular demonstrate the power that racism exerted when individual police 
officers confronted Black citizens. These incidents, and the BBUF’s responses, will be 
addressed in more detail in chapter four. 
The Carceral State in Massachusetts 
The intersectionality that Norton and Stein argue for when analyzing Black 
communities’ experiences with the criminal justice system mirrors the perspective of BBUF 
leadership. Racism, economics, demographics, education, government policies, class, and 
crime were simultaneously on the minds of BBUF leadership and any attempt to disaggregate 
them—to propose that one definitely caused the other—is an attempt in futility. Rather, they 
are mutually reinforcing social forces that acted to move the BBUF to confront the carceral 
state on many fronts at once, just as they led to the societal changes that drove the harsher 
approach to criminal justice. The fact that the BBUF understood the interrelated nature of 
these forces at such an early juncture, and was able to organize against them, speaks to the 
foresight of their leadership and the lived reality of Boston’s Black community in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. 
The War on Poverty of the 1960s and the War on Drugs of the 1980s were significant 
extensions of police power in the United States, but were driven by economics, housing, and 
demographic change as well as the racism that has persisted since the first days of the 
republic. Balto’s analysis of Chicago’s growing police power during the twentieth century 
concludes that these punitive federal projects were not recruiting unwilling or incapable 
police departments. Rather, these “wars” piggybacked on the expanded powers and more 
aggressive stance that urban police departments had been developing for years.36 Growth in 
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police brutality and racialized notions of who criminals were extended into the efforts and 
resources put forth by the federal government. Boston was no exception to these trends. By 
the early 1970s, a federally funded report had deemed the BPD one of the worst police 
departments in the country due to its “notorious reputation for corruption and brutality.”37 
Massachusetts’ carceral state did not appear overnight but, as in Chicago, was the result of 
decades of urban change coupled with racist police, judges, prison administrations, and city 
officials. 
 In the early 1970s, the carceral apparatus in Massachusetts had not yet grown to the 
extent that it would later that decade and in ensuing decades. Yet, the BBUF were working 
against the earliest manifestations of what scholars would later term the carceral state. There 
were two reasons that the BBUF was able to identify and challenge the problem of treating 
poverty with punitive solutions. The first was that Boston’s Black community and the BBUF 
had been the victims of an unjust criminal justice system for decades prior to the 1960s. The 
racism of the police was certainly not a new occurrence. A second reason that the BBUF 
identified and sought to stymie the worst effects of the carceral state was that they 
understood the connections between race, economics, demographics, and crime. Their 
leadership knew that “the experience of the Negro in American cities has been quite different 
from any other group.”38 Most previous inner cities inhabitants, many of them recent 
immigrants, had the expectation of moving upward economically and outward spatially, and 
many did. But, for African Americans, “the ghetto simply expanded” and became “more 
segregated every year.”39 While not as large as some other northern cities, Boston still saw 
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similar social forces operating in its inner city, and the effects and responses to those changes 
mirrored what was happening elsewhere. 
In Boston, like in other Black communities, crime and its prevention were of 
particular importance. The BBUF saw crime as something to be prevented with or without 
help from the police, but in other cities scholars have found that Black communities 
contributed to the growth of the carceral state by electing tough-on-crime politicians and 
advocating for stricter prison sentences. Focusing on New York City, Michael Javen 
Fortner’s Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Politics of Punishment 
finds that the root cause of mass incarceration was not racism, economics, urban change, 
demographic growth or federal policies, but the conservative backlash within the Black 
community to crime and drug abuse. Calling this group of middle-class Black Americans the 
“Black Silent Majority,” Fortner argues that following the civil rights movement, Black 
Americans in Harlem drew on their traditional morals in reaction to urban crime to call for 
harsh punitive measures. Central to the author’s claim is that African Americans were the 
most likely victims of crime in the 1960s. This suffering at the hands of criminals, the 
argument continues, turned them toward the immediate solution of incarceration. The 
development of this view is presented in contrast to that of white liberals who continued to 
embrace rehabilitation to a far greater extent.40 Fortner raises an interesting and controversial 
idea in this book: how much of mass incarceration can be attributed to the actual desires of 
African Americans communities?  
One important goal of Fortner’s work is to provide historical agency to the Black 
community. Gilmore, Alexander, Clegg and Usmani, Norton and Stein, and Hinton all see 
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outside forces and people acting upon African Americans to thrust them into the penal 
system. Fortner attempts instead to look at the forces and people acting within the Black 
community. While Fortner acknowledges that the Black Silent Majority was not the only 
cause of mass incarceration, his book minimizes factors outside of the community that were 
important to the creation of a punitive solution to poverty. The agency of Boston’s Black 
community has been overlooked in past histories of the carceral state; nonetheless, outside 
social forces played a major role in shaping the carceral state as well. 
 As part of their criminal justice activities, the BBUF were concerned with the 
treatment of prisoners and the injustices of the carceral state at the community level. Like 
Alexander, the BBUF saw the intrinsic racism of the criminal justice system in Boston, but 
they also saw economic and political factors as fundamental factors as well. Fortner’s 
emphasis on the agency of the Black community is important when analyzing the BBUF’s 
response to the increasingly punitive turn of the state; but, as Hinton notes, “the version of 
the War on Crime that many Black activists imagined involved community control, 
oversight, and inclusion” in law enforcement.41 So, while Boston’s Black community, acting 
through the BBUF, certainly exercised agency, they more closely resembled Hinton’s 
description than Fortner’s. The BBUF’s response to the racial, economic, and political forces 
that were shaping their reality was to first attempt cooperation with certain facets of the 
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Social Justice Movements in Boston Prior to the BBUF, 1930-1970s 
Many waves of African American community organizers sought to address education, 
economics, housing, and other aspects of mid-century urban social conditions in Boston. 
More ephemeral than the BBUF, these groups arose to fight specific challenges that Boston’s 
Black community was facing at a specific time, and then faded once their goals had been 
achieved or lost momentum in the community. In contrast, the BBUF would exhibit relative 
staying power, lasting for almost a decade.  
Still, the organization comfortably inhabited a place within the history of the 
evolution of Boston’s activist circles. The targets of the earlier reform movements would 
continue on in the BBUF, but more importantly, they served as crucibles for future BBUF 
leaders to cut their teeth and as sources of established tactics. Notably, no group of Black 
activists prior to the BBUF had opposed the carceral state in a systematic manner. This 
attests to the growing impact of the carceral state on Boston’s Black community by the late 
1960s, but also the perception among BBUF leadership that previous reform attempts in 
education, business, welfare, and housing were connected to criminal justice. 
 From 1930 to 1960, increasing Black activism in Boston coincided with an almost 
tripling of the African American population over the same period. During this early phase of 
community organizing the focus was on improving the lives of residents of Roxbury and 
Dorchester, goals more nebulous than the Twenty-One Demands later put forth by the 
BBUF. Some of the primary objectives of Black leaders at the time included racial uplift, 
urban planning, and interracial alliances. Muriel Snowden, a Roxbury activist involved in 
Boston activist circles from the 1940s through the 1970s, linked racial uplift to reinforcing 
democracy. If conditions were to be improved for Boston’s African Americans, in 
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Snowden’s view, democracy had to be strengthened in the Black community as well as more 
generally in the United States. Urban planning and interracial alliances, too, were on 
Snowden’s agenda and linked, particularly when it came to Boston’s Black middle class and 
the white officials who ran the city’s government.42 
 The 1960s was a decade of Black activism in Boston that focused more on specific 
issues to improve everyday conditions than before, but ended with many becoming 
disillusioned with previous tactics, especially after the assassination of Martin Luther King, 
Jr. Reforming public schools was one such area of potential improvement that gained steam 
in the early 1960s and still remained relevant in the era of the BBUF. A major component of 
this movement, the Stay Out for Freedom boycotts of 1963 and 1964 were an attempt to fix 
the deplorable conditions of the segregated Boston Public Schools. Estimates of students 
staying home during the first boycott ranged from 2,000 to 5,000 and during the second 
around 20,000 students or about twenty percent of the public-school population remained 
home.43  
These protests raised awareness about educational inequalities in Boston’s public 
schools, taught organizers how to rally a significant portion of their community around a 
cause, and received attention from newspapers which brought the issue to the notice of 
people outside of Boston’s Black community—all tactics that the BBUF would later 
incorporate into their toolkit. The school reform movement continued through the late 1960s 
and early 1970s with a walkout of 2,000 students in 1971 to protest the dire state of their 
schools. While the student movement did not achieve all of its goals, it eventually managed 
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to get culturally relevant courses included in the curriculum, raise awareness of the need for 
Black faculty, and set the stage for later integration.44 The BBUF was directly involved in 
this latter phase of the school reform movement and some of its future leaders were involved 
in earlier phases. The power inherent in rallying the community behind an emotional issue 
was not lost on them and would become particularly relevant later when they would harness 
that power to combat police shootings. 
Economic issues presented another front in the battle for justice in early 1960s 
Boston. The Boston Action Group (BAG) formed in 1962 to compel businesses to hire Black 
workers. Their direct-action approach to activism influenced the BBUF. BAG’s mix of social 
workers, community activists, and mostly white college students resembled the interracial 
approach to change that was favored during this period but abandoned later in the decade. 
Starting with Wonder Bread, BAG first went door-to-door campaigning with flyers 
explaining the disparities between Black and white workers. Next, the group approached the 
company multiple times to request that more Black workers be hired, but to no avail. Then, 
the group mobilized the Black community in a boycott of Wonder Bread. Under this 
mounting economic pressure and bad press, the company yielded and hired more Black 
workers with promises to continue the practice.45 
Other movements for economic justice like Mothers for Adequate Welfare (MAW) 
and Centralized Investments to Revitalize Community Living Effectively (CIRCLE) 
continued in Boston throughout the 1960s. These were largely protest movements that sought 
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to rally community members to show collective support for justice. This was a tactic that the 
BBUF would employ later.  
CIRCLE, the most influential Boston activist group in the 1960s, played a similar role 
to the one the BBUF would play in Boston’s Black community beginning in 1968.46 Started 
in 1966, CIRCLE was “an organization of organizations which would pool efforts toward 
community development and initiate joint projects.”47 While operating solely in the 
economic arena, this idea—of an umbrella organization for various movements within the 
Black community—would find purchase two years later in the BBUF as it brought together 
disparate organizations and individuals from Boston’s Black community to identify and 
address injustices of all types. 
Another antecedent to the BBUF was Boston’s housing reform movement of the 
1960s. The Community Assembly for a United South End (CAUSE) was ostensibly formed 
to fight for fairness in urban development. It did so by organizing tenants’ associations and 
protesting unfair housing practices. CAUSE’s larger significance to the BBUF, though, lies 
in its attempt to create a governing body for Boston’s Black community that would use its 
political power to fight for their interests. Despite being limited to housing issues, the 
foundational concept of CAUSE, the idea that a group would unite other groups and act in 
the interest of all Black Bostonians, paralleled the later approach of the BBUF. CAUSE 
achieved some success on specific issues, but its long-term impact was as a source of 
inspiration to later activists.48 
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As the 1960s wore on, the civil rights movement picked up momentum and there 
were concrete gains in Boston and other parts of the United States, but many activists became 
embittered by the recalcitrance of the white population and the slow progress that Black 
Americans were making with collaborative efforts. As a leader in Boston’s Black 
community—and a reflection of it—Snowden too made the shift from racial uplift, urban 
planning, and interracial alliances to focus on Black consciousness and self-reliance.49  
The BBUF, forming at the end of the 1960s, was firmly within the latter camp. The 
organization and its leadership retained some of the features of the earlier era like urban 
planning and occasional interracial alliances, but it tempered them with a distrust of the white 
power structure and the assumption that they themselves were ultimately responsible for 
building power within their community in order to achieve any significant change.  This 
perpetual tension within Boston’s Black activist circles would continue during the BBUF’s 
battles to reform the early carceral state. 
Rhetorical Response to the Carceral State 
Since it was chanted by a segment of the demonstrators during the 1966 Freedom 
March across Mississippi, the Black Power slogan has rhetorically and ideologically 
influenced groups like the BBUF. The Black Power movement may have been born of the 
civil rights era, but it grew in strength in the period immediately afterward. By some 
accounts, Black Power was an inward turn for African Americans, the result of 
disillusionment and hardening among activists, especially after the assassination of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.; however, this understanding is far from a settled debate in the 
historical literature. Black Power can also be viewed as part of the long, diverse lineage of 
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African American political thought.50 No matter the interpretation of the origins of Black 
Power, Stokely Carmichael’s speech at the Roxbury YMCA and Dr. King’s assassination 
directly influenced the foundation of the BBUF, placing the organization squarely in the 
Black Power era. 
The BBUF, however, was not purely a Black Power group; other factors like the 
history of Black activism in Boston and lived conditions of Black Bostonians must also be 
considered. Its diverse constituents, grounded in prior local social movements, and conditions 
specific to Boston, meant that it had to balance between Black Power’s ideological 
pronouncements and more pragmatic concerns. Black Power provided a framework for the 
BBUF to mount a rhetorical response to the carceral state, but for the group it was not a rigid 
ideology. The BBUF used Black Power rhetoric to inspire, recruit, and mobilize community 
members for operations, but were willing to go outside of its strictures to try to achieve their 
goals.  
In Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, Kwame Ture (formerly known as Stokely 
Carmichael) and Charles V. Hamilton laid out the foundation of Black Power as an ideology 
that enables African Americans to achieve the goals of the civil rights movement without 
relying on the white power structure. Collaboration, as the authors see it, corrupted previous 
attempts to improve the conditions of Black Americans, and therefore new institutions had to 
be formed within the Black community so that they can “bargain from a position of 
strength.”51 Ture, as the leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, 
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participated in countless protests in the 1960s and traveled around the country giving 
speeches. Ture’s speech in Boston in 1967 was but one stop on that tour. 
 Throughout their existence, and particularly in the area of criminal justice reform, the 
BBUF wrestled with the idea of collaboration. Whether their focus was police shootings, 
courts, prisons, or crime, the BBUF always sought to build institutions in Boston’s Black 
community that were independent of the white power structure. At the same time, however, 
there were numerous attempts to work with the mayor, prison wardens, the city council, and 
other institutional powers. In many cases, the turn toward the Black Power ethos for the 
BBUF was a reaction to failed attempts at change through traditional channels. Notably, the 
BBUF did work as part of an interracial alliance to help prevent construction of a highway 
that would have destroyed many Black neighborhoods in the heart of Boston. However, this 
alliance was with like-minded anti-highway activists, rather than those in positions of 
governmental, business, or political power.52 Actors within the carceral state proved 
particularly difficult to work with and thus the BBUF often ended up eschewing 
collaboration. 
 This is where the rhetoric of the Black Power movement heavily influenced the 
BBUF. Although the BBUF never completely opposed collaboration with the larger white 
power structures of Boston, nor were they an exclusively working-class movement, their 
focus on empowering the Black community, nationalism, and self-reliance was in line with 
other Black Power groups of the time. As the organization developed its ideological 
foundations in 1968, Black laws, political philosophy and nationalism became important 
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conceptual touchstones. These ideas were put to use largely in building institutions within the 
Black community rather than as outward facing documents for wider public consumption. 
 Outside of their base in Boston’s Black community, BBUF rhetoric was decidedly 
more nuanced. Some of the calls within the Twenty-One Demands issued by the group in 
April 1968, such as all white owned businesses in the Black community should be turned 
over to the BBUF immediately, for example, were stunning in their audacity. The BBUF’s 
quick public diminution of the Demands, however, revealed a shrewd leadership that was not 
rigid in their commitment to them. Such ultimatums used tactically were just a starting point 
for negotiations.53 Similarly, calls were made for the complete abolition of prisons within the 
internal documents of the BBUF while leaders attempted to work with prison administrators 
to make small gains for Black prisoners. 
 The code switching of the BBUF’s rhetoric was in some ways more along the lines of 
one of Black Power’s greatest critics, Martin Luther King, Jr. Writing in 1967, Dr. King was 
an early and powerful voice against the movement. He mostly found fault with the rhetoric of 
Black Power, rather than with its goals. King believed that Black Power as a slogan “carried 
the wrong connotations.”54 According to him, use of the phrase in public would isolate Black 
activists and give racist whites another excuse for their segregationist beliefs. The civil rights 
leader warned that only through federal intervention would African Americans be able to 
overcome the economic and political barriers placed in front of them, and that the Black 
Power slogan jeopardized this assistance. King also famously rejected violence as a means to 
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achieve the goals of the civil rights movement in contrast to some Black Power leaders who 
were more open to its use.55  
King’s criticisms of Black Power were incorporated, consciously or not, into the 
BBUF. It is notable, however, that he was more concerned with the appearance of isolationist 
tendencies than with why they were being promoted in the first place. While Dr. King 
remained steadfast in his support of collaboration and integration, he understood the 
frustration and anger that motivated Black Power advocates. Much of the rhetoric espoused 
by the BBUF was that of Black Power; nevertheless, the group’s actions belied a pure 
isolationist worldview. More accurately, the BBUF attempted to work with Boston officials, 
accepted funding from wealthy white Bostonians, and welcomed moderate and conservative 
Black businesses and organizations to their ranks. By taking this perspective seriously—a 
combination of the legacy of the civil rights movement, Black Power, and local 
circumstances—the many motivations of the people and organizations behind the BBUF can 
best be understood. Black Power was neither dogma nor anathema. Rather, it was a tool to 
advance their cause. 
Because a complex negotiation of ideals and pragmatism existed within the Black 
Power movement itself, there is not one definition to sum it up. The Black Panther Party 
(BPP) of Oakland, California, like the BBUF, exhibited these complexities. Comparing the 
BPP and BBUF provides insight into two contemporaneous Black Power organizations and 
shows that there were many shared elements between Black Power groups. But just as often, 
local conditions dictated a group’s outlook. In this comparison, a distinction must be made 
between the BPP before and after 1968. During the earlier period, the BPP was largely 
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concerned with directly combatting the carceral state. Their primary methods for doing so 
were police patrols and armed self-defense. The later period saw a shift to community-
focused programming like free school lunches and liberation schools. Some scholars have 
argued that this lack of a direct challenge to the carceral state represented an 
acknowledgement that the BPP had lost the battle. Historian Donna Jean Murch, however, 
argues that the later period was a return to the roots of African American organizing in 
California that emphasized “churches, sororal/fraternal groups, mutual-aid societies, ‘welfare 
rights’ organizing, and electoral representation.”56 
Both the pre-1968 BPP and the BBUF in the 1970s were concerned with combatting 
the carceral state. They both took on some of the powers of local government when they 
could not get justice through them, created coalitions with white allies, and had community 
roots in waves of Black migrants to their cities. At the same time, the BPP fielded police 
patrols, had a great deal of internal conflict, stuck with a stricter Marxist orientation, and 
used a democratic centralist organizational structure, none of which were features of the 
BBUF.57 The BBUF organized street patrols to combat crime and organized against police 
shootings, but never took a direct role in policing the police. There is also no evidence of any 
major conflicts within the leadership of the BBUF. At least in part this can be attributed to 
the democratic nature of the organization. There were committees like in the BPP, but 
matters were settled by voting within the committees and in community meetings. 
Contrastingly, the BPP was a top-down organization where conflicts between leaders and 
with members abounded. Likewise, the BPP’s Marxist worldview was less dynamic than the 
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BBUF’s simultaneous embrace of pragmatic actions and Black nationalist rhetoric. 
Interestingly, unlike either the BPP or BBUF, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee, another Black Power group headed by Stokely Carmichael, did not coordinate 
with white allies at all.58  
The BBUF embraced Black Power’s rhetoric, but its operations differed drastically 
from better-known Black Power adherents. The conditions in Boston throughout the 1960s 
and the long history of community-based social movements prior to the BBUF’s formation 
exercised just as much influence on the group as Black Power. The negotiation between these 
forces occurred within the BBUF throughout its history, in contrast to the BPP shift from a 
carceral focus to one of community. As Russell Rickford argues in his examination of Black 
Power in Harlem’s schools, for the BBUF, Black Power was never an extremist or rigid 
philosophy. Instead, it was a tool that the community used to understand power structures 
through “multiple, intersecting channels.”59 In scrutinizing the historical role of the BBUF, 
the multifaceted roles of Black Power as ideology and rhetoric need to be considered as 
important elements of the BBUF’s operational paradigm, both in its internal workings and 
how it interfaced with Boston’s white power structure. 
Operational Response to the Carceral State 
 The operational responses of the BBUF to the nascent carceral apparatus were 
simultaneously rooted within Boston’s activist history and indicative of the new Black Power 
movement’s more aggressive approach to injustice, particularly in policing and prisons. 
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While there is no evidence that the BBUF armed themselves to protect their community 
against the police like the BPP, their actions on carceral issues in the late 1960s and early 
1970s placed them, albeit uncomfortably, within the same camp. Instead of confronting the 
carceral state in Massachusetts with guns and police patrols, the BBUF favored rallies, poster 
campaigns, community meetings, petitioning white leaders, and protecting Black citizens and 
businesses from criminals.  
The BBUF’s focus on criminal justice itself was a departure from prior reform 
movements that had acted on education, housing, welfare, jobs and other issues, but largely 
left policing, prisons, courts, and crime alone. One reason for the BBUF’s new focus was that 
the processes of inner-city economic decline, urban renewal, and demographic change had 
yet to lead the state to take a carceral approach to urban poverty prior to their era. Racism 
among police had always been a problem, but in the 1950s and early 1960s the fights were 
against the issues that affected the day-to-day lives of Black Bostonians. The Stay Out for 
Freedom protests, BAG, CIRCLE, and CAUSE all sought to improve things that people dealt 
with regularly, like schools, businesses, and housing. The increasing impact of the carceral 
system on Black lives during this period, however, would add it to the list of important topics 
to address by the end of the 1960s. 
Another reason that the BBUF’s response to the carceral state was innovative was 
that it reflected a larger shift among Boston activists from racial uplift, alliances with white 
activists, and large-scale urban planning projects to focus on promoting and protecting the 
Black community from within. The belief that working with the white power structure for the 
betterment of Boston’s Black citizens had fallen out of favor. The BBUF era was one of self-
reliance. After decades of opposition from white people to the integration of schools and 
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neighborhoods, lack of access to fair jobs and wages, and experiencing violence at the hands 
of police and other racists, alternative approaches became desirable. 
Police violence was one part of the carceral state where the BBUF would focus a 
large portion of their energy. A string of shootings of unarmed Black men between 1970 and 
1972 was met by the BBUF with rallies, trials, posters, and demands to city hall. Petitioning 
for Black judges was another important prong in the BBUF approach to fixing the carceral 
system. Attempting to place African Americans in positions of power within the carceral 
state had not always proven fruitful for activists’ goals, but many believed that it was 
required to begin to create a fair process. Prison reform was another area in which the BBUF 
actively sought to change the direction of what would eventually become the mass 
incarceration of Black men in America. They worked on this issue both by approaching 
prison administrations and by directly helping to uplift prisoners’ lives. Finally, community 
security patrols were favored by the BBUF in order to protect Boston’s Black community 
from criminals. This spoke to a rising concern about crime in their neighborhoods, but also a 
lack of faith in the police and the larger carceral system, a theme that ran through all of the 










Structural Problems and New Organizational Methods 
At the heart of the BBUF were two ideas. One was that the problems facing Black 
Bostonians, and the failure of years of protest to solve them, were structural and deeply 
ingrained in city life. The truth of this knowledge was borne out by individual experience as 
well as the violent backlash to the civil rights movement from segments of white America. 
The indignities suffered by Boston’s African Americans—including the inferior schools they 
were forced to send their children to, the good paying jobs that were denied to them by 
colluding companies, and the impunity with which police officers could harass and assault 
them—were equally considered within the BBUF alongside the large scale mid-century 
social movement that sought to improve and empower Black lives through marches, sit-ins, 
and boycotts. 
 The second idea animating the group was that new organizational methods and 
strategy were needed to face these perpetual roadblocks to progress. Carmichael’s Black 
Power exhortations, Dr. King’s assassination, Boston’s history of community activism, urban 
change, and the burgeoning carceral state were all interwoven into the tapestry of Boston’s 
Black experience and the formation of the BBUF. What was new about the BBUF was its 
attempt to unite the community, and organizations that served it, under one umbrella. This 
was a bold idea for two reasons. For one, Boston’s Black community was ideologically and 
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culturally diverse. This meant that there were those who embraced Black Power, others who 
eschewed it, and many between these two poles. Likewise, some favored what could be 
called a socialist agenda, while others thought that small businesses and Black ownership 
were the keys to a better future. 
 Initial funding for the BBUF came from an unlikely source: wealthy white 
businessmen. Although alliances between wealthy liberals and Black Power activists were 
not unprecedented, it was often an uneasy partnership.60 The BBUF’s most prominent donor, 
Ralph Hoagland, a co-founder of CVS, led a group of Boston businessmen who formed the 
Fund for Urban Negro Development (FUND), the key source of the BBUF’s early funding. 
Over the course of four years, FUND transferred a half million dollars to the BBUF. The 
BBUF distributed the bulk of the money to Black-owned businesses and kept the remainder 
for operating costs. The irony of taking significant funds from wealthy white business 
interests was not lost on BBUF leadership, but the desire to invest that money in Boston’s 
Black community was too great to let the opportunity pass.61 
 To put their ideas and funding into action, the BBUF’s founders created a sweeping 
activist organization meant to be a direct reflection of the concerns of Boston’s Black 
community. Many actions during the civil rights era in Boston were headed by different 
organizations—albeit often by the same activists. Coordination across the community and 
diverse issues required a high degree of bureaucratic organization. The BBUF was headed by 
a Steering Committee of veteran activists like Chuck Turner, Leroy Boston, George 
Morrison, Bertram Alleyne, Drew King, Chuck Williams, Daleno Farrar, and Francine Mills. 
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Beneath them sat committees that were focused on specific issues like crime, justice, prisons, 
education, housing, mobilization, and internal operations. These committees were the means 
by which the BBUF organized. About eighty-five organizations participated in the BBUF 
including the New Urban League, Freedom Industries, the Roxbury Historical Society, Tufts 
Afro-American Society, St. Cyprian’s Episcopal Church, and the Black Panther Party. What 
united these diverse people and organizations was their desire to see positive political, 
economic, and social changes for Black Bostonians. 
To a large extent, the BBUF's successes were due to a high level of organization, 
attested to by the substantial documentation in their archive. This was also a factor in their 
longevity. As Mel King, a leader with the Urban League and BBUF, describes in Chain of 
Change, the lifecycle for activist organizations in Boston was typically only a few years.62 
While the BBUF eventually faded away in the mid-1970s as support from wealthy white 
businessmen waned, they had been active in Boston for the better part of a decade. This 
allowed them to have a large impact in many issues significant to Boston’s Black 
community, none more so than criminal justice reform. 
Organization by Committee 
 Immediately after forming the BBUF, its leadership, member organizations, and 
individual participants went about addressing the most pressing issues facing Boston’s Black 
citizens. Each area of focus was spearheaded by committees which were then overseen by the 
Steering Committee, a collection of the most influential community leaders in the BBUF who 
were able to coordinate the diverse array of actions that their program called for.63 The 
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structure and breadth of the BBUF organization reflected the experiences of activists who 
had been involved in many of the civil rights actions of the preceding two decades and the 
wide-ranging community support that allowed them to field groups that could take on these 
issues. If activism in Boston’s Black community during the civil rights era had been a 
collection of disparate and ephemeral groups, the BBUF, in contrast, was built to be a long-
lasting umbrella organization. 
Most committees met regularly in the late 1960s and into the early 1970s. The 
Steering Committee, in its role as the executive level meeting for the organization, addressed 
issues from the other groups and acted as the BBUF decision making body. On January 13, 
1969 alone, the Steering Committee took up issues as diverse as a funding proposal from 
CAUSE, protests against a TV show, activities for Malcolm X Day, Turner’s interview on a 
radio show, boycotting a Volvo dealership, organizing Black churches, and internal problems 
with other community organizations.64 As evidenced by the wide range of meeting topics, 
energy and ambition ran high among the leadership of the BBUF. More concretely, however, 
this vigor was translated into tangible results by the committees that worked under the 
direction of the Steering Committee.  
 Out of sixteen total committees, the BBUF devoted four to criminal justice issues. 
Having put so many of their resources toward this effort, it is apparent that this was a major 
issue for the group, if not the most important one. The Justice Committee was one of the 
most active BBUF committees and was most heavily involved in the actions that the BBUF 
took on police shootings. The Defense Committee, Prison Committee and the Committee on 
Crime similarly worked on criminal justice issues. In the case of the last of these, the group 
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developed a detailed plan to organize, finance, and recruit a Black security corps to protect 
the community. This ultimately came to fruition in the security patrols that would begin 
walking Boston’s streets in 1970.  The police shootings of unarmed Black men that would 
rock Boston’s Black community between 1970 and 1972 were addressed by the Justice 
Committee. Letters to city officials were sent, reports of eyewitnesses to the shootings were 
read, and organization and procedures for community trials were hammered out at committee 
meetings.65 When taken as a whole, the BBUF’s work on carceral state reform was channeled 
through these groups. 
 Unfortunately, there are only two full sets of meeting minutes for the BBUF Justice 
Committee, along with several ancillary documents like membership lists and draft letters in 
the BBUF archive. Despite this dearth of written material, what is available shows deep 
involvement in the events of the day, and it is clear that the committee’s biggest concerns 
were police abuse, repercussions for said abuse, and publicizing their response to garner 
further support.66 The “Poster Day” that followed the murder of Franklin Lynch was perhaps 
the Justice Committee’s biggest undertaking. The coordination and planning for this event 
were done by Justice Committee mobilization of individuals and business owners. One draft 
letter notes that those businesses that hung posters in their windows were harassed by city 
police officers or had their posters stolen.67 Nonetheless, the posters became a common site 
within the Black neighborhoods of Boston. 
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 The BBUF Committee on Crime, like the Justice Committee, played a part in fighting 
the carceral state’s effects on Boston’s Black community. Spurred to action by the robbery of 
Unity Bank in December 1970 and the murder of two security guards at Freedom Foods in 
1971, the most significant document produced by the Committee on Crime was “An Outline 
Proposal for the Establishment of a Community Crime Commission.” This detailed document 
proposed to create a political arm to fight crime alongside the Community Security Agency 
(CSA), the action-oriented outgrowth of the Committee on Crime. Working together, these 
two sub-organizations of the BBUF were to oversee crime prevention in a community seeing 
increasing crime rates.  
An initial $15,000 was allocated by the United Front Foundation to get the 
Community Crime Commission started. The charges of the commission were to hire 
employees, collect funds, wage a publicity campaign against crime, push their agenda in the 
media, work with the BPD and the Attorney’s Office, receive complaints from community 
residents, and write a proposal for funding. Job descriptions and a budget were drawn up as 
part of the plan too. The recommended commissioners in the proposal included reporters, 
business people, a Muslim minister, community leaders, and politicians.68 The broad swath 
of community members asked to work on this issue as well as the broad mandate for the 
commission indicates how dire the situation had become for the community and what little 
faith Black Bostonians had that the white power structure would respond accordingly. The 
liaison duties of the commission speak to some degree of willingness to cooperate with 
authorities, but it is obvious that this was the work of a frustrated community attempting to 
come up with their own solution to an intractable problem rather than waiting on a cavalry 
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that would never arrive. Unlike those of the CSA, the Community Crime Commission’s 
specific activities are not well documented, but the attempts to work with the BPD and 
mayor’s office during the string of police shootings of unarmed Black men indicate that to 
some degree the committee was at work. 
 Like the Justice Committee and the Committee on Crime, the Prison Committee was 
most active in the early 1970s. Just as those committees focused on discrete areas of the 
carceral state, police reform and crime respectively, the Prison Committee sought changes in 
the prisons and jails of Massachusetts. Due to the separation of inmates from society, 
however, the Prison Committee did not operate like other BBUF committees, typically 
collections of leaders and activists from Boston’s Black community. Instead, the Prison 
Committee focused on the conditions and rights of prisoners, especially incarcerated African 
Americans, with the long-term goal of prison abolition. In 1971, the Prison Committee 
dedicated itself to working as the arm of the Act Committee, a group formed by prisoners at 
Norfolk Prison.69 In this role, the BBUF’s committee served as a liaison between Boston’s 
Black community and those on the inside. 
 Although mass incarceration was in its infancy, the BBUF recognized the importance 
of working on prison reform due to its disproportionate effects on African Americans. The 
intertwining threads of the carceral state were only beginning to form during the BBUF’s 
active period, but it was already apparent to activists and community leaders that the changes 
were necessary. This understanding placed the BBUF ahead of their time. While most 
politicians, judges, police officers, and city bureaucrats were largely unaware of or 
indifferent to the suffering of those in Boston’s Black community, the BBUF was attempting 
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to address the growing carceral state decades before white America acknowledged what was 
happening. 
Ideology for a “Non-ideological” Organization 
 When activists, politicians, revolutionaries, business owners, community 
organizations, and concerned citizens came together in 1968 to form the BBUF, their short-
term goal was “operational unity.” In concept, the BBUF was to transcend ideology to 
achieve the goals that were shared by all Black Bostonians. In practice, this meant that there 
was room for ideological diversity, even conflict. Intermediate goals included creating or 
strengthening Black organizations and controlling funds that would benefit the Black 
community. In due course, though, the BBUF sought to separate completely from Boston by 
incorporating its African American sections as an entirely new city. Leaders acknowledged 
that this would not solve all of the Black community’s problems, but they believed that it was 
the only solution that would give them a chance to bypass the white power structure 
entrenched in the local, state, and municipal governments.70 Even though their ultimate goal 
was never achieved—separation from Boston was attempted during the 1980s Mandela 
referendums—the BBUF’s smaller scale organizational aspirations did eventually become a 
reality. 
 Operational unity was resoundingly successful for the BBUF. Churches and trade 
groups sat at the table with the Black Panthers and the Malcolm X Foundation.71 This speaks 
to the shared legacy of racism that Black Bostonians had endured throughout their lives as 
well as the continuing obstacles that discrimination had placed in their paths regardless of 
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their ideal conception of society. The decentralized and single issue-based approaches that 
Boston activists had taken during the 1950s and 1960s gave way to a more unified approach 
embodied by the BBUF. When understood within the larger context of African American 
activism up until 1968 in Boston, the BBUF’s doctrine of operational unity was a direct 
rejoinder to what many viewed as insufficient progress. 
 Indicative of the unified approach that gave name to the BBUF, each member 
organization’s president or representative officer was required to sign a statement of 
commitment to a “Black United Front in Boston.” With this pledge, the signee agreed to 
identify a voting representative from their organization. Furthermore, this representative was 
required to identify as Black and the organizational member would commit to a program of 
majority rule within the umbrella group.72 Committing to sending a Black representative 
ensured that organizations were either already part of the Black community or were at least 
integrated enough to have a Black person in a leadership position. As for the internal 
machinery of the BBUF, the promise to abide by majority rule indicates a commitment to 
democracy as the means of governing a wide-ranging organization.  
In many ways, the BBUF was the executive, judicial, and legislative branch for 
Boston’s Black community, and, although community members were victims of gross 
injustices in a democratic nation, the organization remained committed to democracy 
anyway. Community-based democracy was substituted for state-based democracy in reaction 
to the abuses of power by Boston’s white dominated institutions. The commitment to 
democracy was important for the BBUF, but the injustices of American democracy meant 
they needed to apply this principle in new ways. Like the concept of democracy, in the 
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impulse to attempt reconciliation with carceral institutions, and as community trials and 
security patrols would later show in their fight for criminal justice reform, the BBUF did not 
find fault with the ideas of policing, prisons, and courts in theory, but found the iniquities 
within these institutions and how they had been used to control and exploit Black Americans 
to be the true problem. 
In spite of the BBUF’s claims to ideological transcendence, unity was not created 
around shared grievances alone. A great deal of effort was made by the BBUF to also create 
shared principles that would unite Boston’s Black community and pave the way for a Black 
separatist future. Throughout the BBUF’s history of actions, including those seeking reform 
in the carceral state, organizers would continually refer back to those foundational documents 
in which they envisioned a new society. These seminal papers included proposed laws, 
statements of political philosophy and Black national principles, and culminated in twenty-
one public demands to the city government. This aspect of operational unity informed the 
BBUF’s future actions against the growing carceral state. 
On November 2, 1969, the BBUF’s eight Black Laws were ratified by a vote of those 
attending a conference at the Urban League Barn. Laws one and two deal with encountering 
“enemy authorities.” The first of these dictates that Black people must help one another 
whenever someone is in trouble with oppressive authorities. The second law prohibits Black 
people from giving any other Black person’s name to the police. Following those laws, the 
third and fourth laws establish the supremacy of the “high council” and forbid Black people 
from seeking justice outside of that body. The fifth, sixth, and seventh laws explain how 
Black people are to protect the rights of the entire community. The final law exhorts Black 
people to disregard worldly desires, especially the desire for money, in favor of solidarity. 
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An addendum of “intolerable offenses” was attached to the Blacks Laws. Those offenses 
included raping, killing, betraying, luring into drug use, or assaulting any Black person.73 
Upon a cursory glance, these laws may seem like the rules of an imagined Black separatist 
state. In fact, they quite closely hewed to the principles that the BBUF would put into 
practice not long after their creation as they sought to provide alternatives to the carceral 
state.  
One area in which the BBUF’s ideology guided their operations was in combatting 
police brutality. From 1970 to 1972, the BBUF was engaged in direct action following four 
police killings of unarmed Black men, the details of which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. In these instances, the Black Laws were transformed from words on paper to action 
among Boston’s African American community, creating solidarity around an alternative 
justice system in which Black people could find fairness. Nothing exemplified this 
alternative like the trials that the BBUF held for the offending officers in two cases. 
Following what was seen as an inability or unwillingness on the part of white authorities to 
hold officers accountable, the BBUF held their own trials, invoking the supremacy of the 
community’s judgement over that of white society, and attempted to hold those found guilty 
responsible. Distrust of the white power structure and self-reliance came to the fore in these 
laws and became the primary means by which justice would become reconceptualized by the 
group. 
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The BBUF political platform was a list of eight things that they believed they needed 
to control to address the plight of Black Bostonians: land, politics, security, justice, schools, 
economy, housing, and communication.74 Comparable to the other ideological formulations 
for operational unity, the BBUF political platform most directly called out the insufficient 
state of security and justice in Boston for African Americans and identified what needed to 
be done. Security included protection from crimes and invasion. Later, as the BBUF created 
the Community Security Agency (CSA) this concept was put into practice. The CSA 
patrolled Black businesses in order to prevent crime, but also to provide an alternative to the 
Boston police, viewed as an external threat to the community. The other prong of the 
political platform relevant to the carceral state was the administration of justice. This 
declaration presaged the community-controlled courts that would soon be needed after police 
who shot unarmed Black men were acquitted in white courts.  
Human rights, too, were an important element of the BBUF’s belief in how justice 
would be achieved. The rights of people were placed above those of property as this 
alternative system of justice was formulated. The inhumanity of the Black experience in the 
American justice system connected the BBUF movement to all those who sought the basic 
rights to which all individuals and groups are entitled. 
Less tangible than the Black Laws or BBUF political platform, but just as influential 
on the BBUF’s movement for a fair criminal justice system, was its Nation Building 
Concept. Likely created around the same time as the Black Laws, BBUF ideas for a Black 
nation were just as relevant to the criminal justice initiatives of the group in the coming 
years. According to the drafters of the Concept, a Black nation was to be based on the seven 
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principles of Kwanzaa: umoja (unity), kujichagulia (self-determination), ujima (collective 
work and responsibility), ujamaa (co-operative economics), nia (purpose), kuumba 
(creativity), and Imani (faith).75 Taking criminal justice into their own hands, the BBUF 
embraced what they saw as the principles that would guide them as an autonomous people, 
separate from the system that had oppressed them for so long. The balance between 
combatting the racist carceral state and visions of a utopian future were not separate. 
Creating the principles of the society that they hoped to achieve one day gave the BBUF and 
Boston’s Black community measuring posts by which to compare the current state of affairs. 
 Contrasting the philosophical bent of the aforementioned documents, the Twenty-One 
Demands issued to Mayor Kevin White by the BBUF in April 1968 were a concrete 
manifestation of their guiding ideology. Externally, the Demands were issued to get the 
attention of the wider world with the hope of gaining concessions. Internal to the Black 
community they served to further create unity and provide guideposts for progress like 
previously issued steering documents. Above all other Demands, the one for police 
departments in Black areas to be overseen by Black captains most directly spoke to the future 
push for greater Black representation within the criminal justice system. 
In general, however, the Demands were a cry for control over the destiny of the Black 
community and an end to its exploitation along political, economic, educational, and policing 
lines that reverberated in the actions of BBUF activists as they sought a criminal justice 
structure outside of what they perceived as the failed American one. In fact, the opening lines 
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of the Demands declare a state of emergency for Boston’s Black community, going so far as 
to declare it unsafe for African Americans to go about their normal lives.76 
Rallying the Community 
 In the early days of the BBUF a lot of energy was spent creating solidarity around the 
idea of the BBUF and the issues it championed. Issuance of the BBUF’s attention-grabbing 
Twenty-One Demands and Black Solidarity Day, a rally against racism and repression, were 
the two most prominent events that created a sense of unity and heralded the beginning of a 
new community-focused power. In addition to their rallying effect in the Black community, 
these events sent a message to white Bostonians—the Demands directly and Black Solidarity 
Day less so—that society needed to change. The Demands were reprinted in the Boston 
Globe and caused a stir among other groups within Boston and the surrounding area. They 
also got the attention of Mayor White, who later met with the group to discuss them. In light 
of the later actions by the BBUF, these events can also be viewed as precursors to the rallies 
that would help bring attention to the issue of police violence. 
In April 1968, the BBUF held a packed rally at White Stadium, a 10,000-seat venue 
in Franklin Park. At the event the leadership presented the Twenty-One Demands to the 
Black community and implored Boston’s Mayor White to heed their call for justice.77 In A 
People’s History of the New Boston, Jim Vrabel argues that the BBUF’s demands “could 
hardly have been more extreme” and that they were put forth by “militants.” The author goes 
on to argue that the NAACP put forth another set of demands, and that because these were 
well received by City Hall, they were moderate and realistic.78 This treatment of the event 
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and the organization ignores several factors. For one, the BBUF certainly contained members 
who could have been considered militants, like the Boston Black Panther Party, but much of 
its membership was far from it, including organizations such as Freedom Industries and the 
New Urban League. A second problem with Vrabel’s interpretation is that the BBUF had the 
explicit support of 10,000 Black community members and many others who did not attend 
the rally, demonstrating that this was a mainstream movement. 
Another problem with Vrabel’s understanding is that he ignores the rhetorical 
purpose of the Twenty-One Demands. The BBUF’s subsequent negotiations with Mayor 
White showed the more pragmatic approach that BBUF leadership would use time and time 
again. On April 11, 1968, following the rally and the issuance of the Demands, Mel King, 
Chuck Turner, Leroy Boston, and other BBUF leaders met with the mayor, but stated that the 
demands that were read at the rally, sent to the mayor, and published in the Boston Globe 
were only an opening salvo in an attempt to start a dialogue.79 The rally and the Demands 
had gained the attention of Boston’s mayor and the newspaper reading public, but BBUF 
leadership was willing to negotiate. This pragmatic approach to the BBUF’s Demands 
eventually led to most of them being put in place in some form, albeit many of the changes 
took decades rather than months or years.80 Vrabel completely ignores this fact. 
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 Black Solidarity Day was held on May 19, 1970. The day included awareness 
sessions, a march through Roxbury, workshops, music, speakers, and a showing of the film 
“Battle of Algiers.” An African ceremonial feast at the Roxbury Boys Club wrapped  
up the day.81 It was an event that brought Boston’s Black community together in pride and 
consciousness. Mel King, then the head of the New Urban League in Boston, was one of the 
keynote speakers. The theme of King’s speech was self-taxation, but underlying it was the 
sense of self-reliance and limited help from the white community that underpinned BBUF 
efforts on criminal justice. In fact, King’s ideas for community control through self-taxation 
included decriminalizing some illegal activities. In particular, he called for the legalization 
and taxation of “numbers,” the illegal lottery run by the mafia according to King.82 The 
connections between crime, community control, and justice were clear to King as they were 
to the other leaders of the BBUF. 
Through committees, rallies, and ideology, the BBUF were able to unite Boston’s 
Black community on a range of issues. Criminal justice reform was at the top of the group’s 
list and each of these tactics were used to garner support for other actions around police 
shootings, court appointments, prison reform, and community security. The rally for the 
Twenty-One Demands and Black Solidarity Day set the stage for the protests and trials 
against police brutality that the BBUF would lead. Likewise, the BBUF committees would be 
the spring boards used by the group to act. Finally, the Black Power inspired ideology 
developed by the BBUF was used to create community cohesion and would reverberate in 
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their agitations for Black judges and the fair treatment of Black prisoners, as well as in 
community security patrols. 
While BBUF leadership was able to unite individuals and organizations from across 
Boston’s Black community on a range of issues, they were ultimately unable to stop the 
growth of the carceral state in Massachusetts. Due to the systemic nature of the carceral state, 
a community-based response had serious limits, but it was the primary type of response that 
the BBUF had available to them. As the 1970s wore on, the end of funding from wealthy 
white donors, a national recession, school desegregation, and the City of Boston’s near 
municipal bankruptcy either made it more difficult for the BBUF to stop the encroaching 
carceral state or meant that activists and city leaders were focused elsewhere. Compounding 
these multiple crises was the continued flight of white residents, jobs, and capital to locations 
outside of the urban center. The growth of the carceral state paralleled these social processes 
and was inextricably bound up with them. The social conditions that made it difficult to offer 
a community-based alternative to the carceral state in the 1960s and 1970s are what make 










Criminal Justice Reform 
The BBUF was acutely aware of the interrelated nature of police shootings, court 
appointments, prisons, poverty, government, and racism and how these social forces 
burdened their community. Contemporary scholars have developed the concept of the 
carceral state to describe the intersection of communities and criminal justice institutions, 
but, as early as the late 1960s, the BBUF was already working against it. At the height of 
their activity, the BBUF took actions on police shootings, court appointments, prisons, and 
community security—all at roughly the same time. The breadth and scope of their organizing 
speaks to an energized, well-funded organization as well as leadership that recognized the 
systemic nature of the problems stacked against Boston’s Black community. Both their 
successes and failures in combatting the carceral state are important historical antecedents to 
current attempts at reform, as well as valuable lessons on the limits of institutional 
cooperation and resistance. 
 Disturbing parallels exist between the circumstances that launched BBUF direct 
action and the police killings of so many unarmed Black men in recent years. The brutal 
nature of the early 1970s killings—and the lack of consequences for the officers involved—
are familiar to anyone who reads newspaper headlines today. What is often 
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overlooked today is that neither police shootings of Black people nor the outrage that follow 
them is new. In the four killings by police in which the BBUF sought justice, only one 
resulted in what could be considered success at the institutional level: the dismissal of the 
offending officer. 
The three other kinds of reform efforts that the BBUF undertook—in courts, prisons, 
and security—similarly offer lessons for those seeking justice within the network of 
institutions that deal with crime. Here, too, the BBUF struggled to find success at the 
institutional level and, in the case of community security, eschewed working with city and 
state institutions almost entirely. The gap between what Boston’s Black community wanted 
for its members and what white-dominated institutions were willing to provide attest to the 
systemic racism that is at the heart of the carceral state. Police killing with impunity, judges 
who justified the violence, prisons that sought only to dehumanize, and neighborhoods left 
unprotected were the symptoms as well as causes of this cycle in Boston, with each aspect of 
the carceral state feeding off the others. 
At the community level, the BBUF achieved a great deal of cooperation and, for a 
time, inspired thousands to believe that change was possible. Their protests set the template 
for the organization and publicity that would be used in later decades to protest the same 
injustices. Likewise, their demands for accountability from city government and suggestions 
for reform would not be taken up in many cases until the present. Their calls for greater 
Black representation on the police force, in court rooms, and in decision-making bodies echo 
reforms that continue to be advocated for today. The BBUF were ahead of their time and 
their struggles offer lessons about which strategies work as well as where some of the pitfalls 
may lie for anyone seeking to end the injustices inherent in the carceral state. Studying the 
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BBUF’s rallying of a broad coalition, development of innovative tactics and strategies, and 
attempts to work across racial divides provides new insights on the history of Boston as well 
as the Black American struggle. 
Police Shootings 
 Beginning in 1970, the BBUF acted as an investigative body and court for police 
shootings that they believed would not otherwise have received proper scrutiny. At the same 
time, the frequency of police shootings of Black men in Boston in the early 1970s 
demonstrated to all the impunity with which the BPD was able to mete out violence without 
fear of repercussion. While shootings and other acts of police brutality were not new to 
Boston, what was new was that the BBUF could channel the community’s anger into a single 
resounding plea for reform.  
Similar movements had taken on incidents of police brutality in other cities in the 
1960s. In one example from North Richmond, California in 1967, police shot Denzil Dowell, 
a Black teen, multiple times and fled the scene. Dowell’s body was discovered hours later by 
his family, who sought help pursing his killers from the Black Panther Party for Self-
Defense. Like the BBUF after instances of police brutality, the Panthers first attempted to 
work with city officials to find justice for Dowell and his family, but finding none along that 
path, and like the BBUF a few years later, the Panthers held rallies that attracted large crowds 
in protest.83 Over the long-term too, the ideas that germinated in BBUF circles eventually 
became mainstream in Boston. In another parallel example from New York City, activists 
spent decades trying to establish an independent review board to investigate incidents of 
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police brutality.84 In the end, the BBUF concluded that community members from outside the 
BPD needed a say in matters of police misconduct. Many direct actions of the BBUF were 
due to a lack of accountability from city and police leadership, but the group continually 
pressed for formal oversight by Mayor Kevin White and the city government regardless. 
 The first, and most famous, police shooting that the BBUF became involved in 
investigating, trialing, and redressing was that of Franklin Lynch. The attention given to 
Lynch’s killing can be attributed not only to his regional celebrity, but also to the 
senselessness of his death at the hands of a police officer. Lynch lived in Georgia and New 
Jersey before coming to Boston to pursue a career in music. Once settled in the city, he 
jumped headlong into the emerging soul music scene, and shortly before his death released 
his first single, “Young Girl.”85 By many measures, Lynch was on his way to a successful 
singing career, but tragically, he would be gunned down by Patrolman Walter Duggan at 
Boston City Hospital before getting the chance to reach his full potential. 
 On March 7, 1970, Lynch was a patient at City Hospital due to a bout of odd behavior 
over the preceding few days. The events that would quickly unfold that day attest to the fact 
that something was wrong with Lynch’s mental state. The Boston Globe reported two days 
after the shooting that what resulted in Lynch’s killing started as a fight between Lynch and 
another patient, John Condon. After having broken up the fight one time, Duggan became 
frustrated when it resumed. At that point, the patrolman pushed Condon down, breaking his 
leg, and aimed his gun at Lynch. According to the Globe reporter, who was an eyewitness to 
the shooting, five fatal shots came after Lynch snapped a towel at Duggan’s gun. The bullets 
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not only tore through Lynch, but one hit another patient who happened to be the father of 
another patrolman.86 The second victim died twelve days later.87 The brutal force with which 
Duggan killed Lynch stirred outrage in Boston’s Black community and, in response, the 
BBUF took up Lynch’s cause. 
Suspicious of the ability of the police department and the court system to act 
impartially in investigating the death of an unarmed Black man at the hands of a patrolman, 
the BBUF began their own inquest on March 25. The organization put out a call to any 
lawyers within their community who could serve as judges during the proceedings.88 The 
result of the inquest was a charge of murder against Duggan. Meanwhile, the fears that 
Lynch’s killer would not face justice were confirmed by Boston Municipal Court Judge 
Elijah Adlow. The judge’s report “completely exonerated” Duggan and found that he was 
justified in the shooting because the officer needed to impress upon Lynch the futility of his 
actions.89 The obvious absurdity of killing someone to get a point across sparked disgust 
among Boston’s African Americans and led the BBUF to convene a “Black People’s Court” 
to try the patrolman. 
“People’s courts” were not unique to the BBUF. In July 1967, following the killing of 
three young Black men by police officers during the Detroit Rebellion at the Algiers Motel, a 
tribunal was held to try the officers involved. The trial attracted over 2,000 attendees and 
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international media coverage.90 In other instances, community trials took on issues other than 
police killings. In December 1970, the Met Council, Black Panther Party, and Young Lords 
put New York City’s mayor, housing officials, and bank executives on trial for the abysmal 
conditions in minority neighborhoods.91 Trials like these were a manifestation of the 
frustration with traditional institutions that activists felt during the Black Power era. In 
Detroit in 1967 and Boston in 1970, mainstream courts had failed to find police officers 
guilty of any wrongdoing even though the evidence strongly suggested otherwise. Likewise, 
the New York City trial over housing drew attention to the failures of city government and 
businesses to provide adequate housing for poor people. Although the murder trials were 
spurred by specific events, like the housing tribunal, the belief in institutional failure had 
been sown long before. 
The outline of Duggan’s trial in the Black People’s Court shows a meticulously 
crafted legal proceeding that relied on the BBUF’s “Black Laws” for its jurisprudence and 
witness accounts as evidence.92 Obvious parallels with the mainstream American justice 
system aside, Black People versus Walter Duggan was a radical reconceptualization of 
criminal justice. Rather than relying on federal, state, or municipal outlets as the loci of the 
judicial process, the BBUF brought it to the community level, the only place where they 
believed they would find fairness. The fact that neither the defendant nor several of the 
witnesses (Mayor White was called to testify) appeared shows the legal limits of the BBUF’s 
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trial strategy; however, its emotional impact may have been the real point. According to an 
internal BBUF evaluation of the trial, “people left with a sense of pride and progress.”93 
The Black People’s Court found Duggan guilty of murder in the first degree in front 
of an estimated 700 attendees. While there were some within the community who saw the 
Black People’s Court as an exercise in futility, the BBUF believed they had exposed the 
hypocrisy experienced by African Americans in the “white man’s court.”94 The high number 
of attendees for a trial that would have no legally enforceable sentence shows the support that 
the BBUF received among Boston’s Black community in their efforts and the vast frustration 
that existed with police. The detail with which the trial was executed—having a presiding 
judge, allowing witnesses to testify for the prosecution and defense, and providing closing 
arguments95—attested to the community-wide desire for justice. By following the typical 
proceedings of a “white” court, the Black People’s Court incisively modeled the impartiality 
that they believed should be given to all, knowing that they themselves were not granted such 
basic rights. 
At the trial’s conclusion, Duggan was found guilty of murder. Having been 
exonerated in the municipal court by Judge Adlow, however, Duggan was to remain on the 
police force without consequence. The injustice of the white court’s decision and the lack of 
power to hold Duggan accountable in the case of the Black People’s Court left the BBUF 
limited options for seeking justice. So, as a community-based response, the group settled on a 
“Poster Day”96 that would “out” Duggan for his crime. The posters included Duggan’s 
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conviction as a murderer in the People’s Court, as well as his photograph and home 
address.97  
Two conflicting notions of justice arose from the BBUF’s actions in the case. One is 
that they were protecting the African American community from a dangerous predator and 
publishing his picture and address would keep the community wary. Another possible 
purpose was that the BBUF was endorsing vigilante action against Duggan, although this was 
denied by BBUF leader Chuck Turner.98 Perhaps both were true at once. In a twist of bitter 
irony, at the end of his career, Duggan would become the assistant commander of the 
Community Disorders Unit, the division of the BPD charged with investigating hate crimes.99 
Lynch’s killing was not the last time the BBUF would investigate and challenge the 
official narrative of a police-involved shooting of a Black man. In the two years following 
Lynch’s murder, Raymond Grady, Derek Culbert, and Thomas Cornell would all be shot by 
Boston police. Cornell was the only one of these three to die from his wounds, but the other 
two suffered permanent physical and psychological trauma. While the BBUF investigated the 
circumstances of each of these shootings, they would only hold a community-wide trial again 
in Grady’s case.100 As for Culbert and Cornell, the BBUF sought justice through more 
official channels than they did in the case of Lynch, surprisingly with some success. These 
victories, however limited, may have been the reason that the leadership of the BBUF did not 
go to the same lengths that they did in the Lynch case again. 
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On May 22, 1971, Raymond Grady was shot by a Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority policeman. As in Lynch’s case, a fairly minor squabble escalated to a shooting and 
took place in a setting—a crowded city bus—that begs one to question the reasoning of the 
police officer involved. The major difference between Grady and Lynch’s cases was that the 
former miraculously survived, although part of his brain was removed.101 The damage would 
ultimately cause Grady to suffer a severe change in his personality and cognition. Deckle 
McLean of the Boston Globe was skeptical of the officer’s reasons for inserting himself in a 
conversation between Grady and another passenger, Joseph Jones, going so far as to write 
that “in no version of this story would the events that produced the shooting have occurred 
without the instigation of the transit policemen.” 
 McLean’s investigation found four plausible scenarios that led to Grady’s shooting. 
The first posited that a fight started between Jones and a white man on the bus. From there, 
the fight escalated, with two other men getting involved, one Black, and the other white. 
During the uproar, the second white man, who was an undercover MBTA police officer, shot 
Grady between the eyes. The second story of what led to the shooting came from the BPD. In 
this account, Jones swore at a uniformed police officer and then physically assaulted him. 
Grady joined in to help Jones, and then another white non-uniformed police officer stepped 
in to help the first one. The third account of the events came from a man who was walking 
down the street as the events unfolded and interviewed bus passengers afterward. According 
to witnesses on the bus, Jones was joking around and was told to shut up by a white MBTA 
policeman. The policeman then grabbed Jones and a fight ensued. Another pair of men, one 
being Grady, the other a white man in plain clothes, stood up and became involved. The 
                                                          




second white man then shot Grady. All witnesses agreed that neither Black man was armed. 
The fourth and final account of the shooting came from the MBTA police. In this telling, 
Grady and Jones started a fight with a policeman, and encouraged all of the bus passengers to 
attack the police officers. Then, the uniformed officer fired a round into the roof to scare the 
crowd. At this point, even though most of the passengers had fled, according to the MBTA 
police, Jones went for the officer’s gun while Grady attacked the second, plainclothes officer 
with a razor. The second officer then shot Grady in self-defense.102 
 The findings of the BBUF investigation would later confirm the first and third stories 
that McLean heard. Witness testimony for the inquest included the driver of the bus, the 
police, and Grady. According to the bus driver, an MBTA officer had shot a Black teenager 
and a Black man on the bus, but it was so crowded he could not see what happened until it 
was over. He did note that he saw the bullet hole in the first victim’s head and that parts of 
his brain were scattered in the aisle. In a second account from police, a passenger had pulled 
a gun on the bus driver and the MBTA officer had responded with force.103  
Finally, in Grady’s account, the facts of the case match the Globe versions of the 
story where the shooting started as a minor altercation. As he attested from his hospital bed, 
the problem started when the MBTA officer told Jones to shut up and be quiet. Jones talked 
back to the officer saying that he was not doing anything wrong. The officer perceived Jones 
as being insolent and proceeded to grab him. Grady said that he intervened to help Jones 
because Jones was not doing anything wrong. After that, the plainclothes officer appeared 
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and started beating Grady over the head with his gun. Grady did not remember much after 
that.104  
Because the driver’s account so thoroughly differs from that of the police in this case, 
the idea that someone held up the bus driver can be dismissed. Thus, the likely account is 
some version that corresponds to the accounts of Grady, the bus driver, and other witnesses. 
Although the findings of the BBUF shed light on the true events on that MBTA bus, the only 
action taken was to ask the community to write or call MBTA police headquarters.105 Even 
though justice for Grady proved elusive, the following police shooting would yield more 
tangible results for the BBUF in their fight against police violence. 
The next police shooting of a member of Boston’s Black community occurred less 
than two months later. This time, Derek Culbert was “accidentally” shot on July 19, 1971 
while inside the new Dudley Street Police Station #2 by Patrolman Anthony J. Giorgi.106 
Unlike in the murder of Lynch or the permanent crippling of Grady, however, the BBUF 
would, surprisingly, find a modicum of justice for Culbert. Calling on the Afro-American 
Patrolman’s League (AAPL) for support, BBUF leadership rallied Black police officers to 
get Giorgi dismissed.107 The AAPL was founded in Chicago in 1968 after Officer Edward 
“Buzz” Palmer was ordered to “shoot to kill” during the uprising following Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s assassination. Initially, the AAPL was led by Palmer and sought to align Black 
police officers with the needs of their communities, but this stance proved too radical for 
some and Palmer was eventually forced out. In 1972 the AAPL was merged into the National 
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Black Police Association.108 The AAPL’s support furthered the BBUF’s case that police 
violence against members of the Black community was recognized as a problem by some in 
their own ranks. 
On August 2, 1971, the police commissioner heard from Deputy Superintendent 
Arthur C. Cadegan regarding complaints against Giorgi, charging him with violating the 
rules and regulations of the BPD. Giorgi was found guilty and dismissed.109 In part, credit for 
the successful removal of a violent police officer can be attributed to the pressure exerted by 
the BBUF. In contrast to the previous two shootings, the BBUF worked within the existing 
power structure, rather than the community, to get results. This demonstrates the flexibility 
with which the BBUF was willing to act in order to improve conditions for African 
Americans. The frequency of unarmed Black men being shot in seemingly innocuous 
locations—the hospital, a bus, now a police station—by police may have also finally led the 
city administration to give in to the Black community’s calls for justice. 
 Cornell Thomas was the fourth and final unarmed Black victim of a police shooting 
for whom the BBUF would seek justice. The official narrative of events that led to Thomas’ 
death was told in several Boston newspapers. According to these accounts, on February 9, 
1972, Thomas, a nineteen-year-old, was driving a Volkswagen bus the wrong way down a 
one-way street. At the same time, Patrolman Richard Armstead was driving in the correct 
direction and the two narrowly missed each other. Next, the officer opened the driver’s door 
on the Volkswagen and asked Thomas for his license and registration. In the BPD’s telling, 
                                                          
108 African American Police League, March 28, 2008 on Archive.org. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130802071400/http://aapoliceleague.org/index.html. 
109 Police Commissioner Edmund L. McNamara, “Personnel Order No. 3184,” Bureau of Administration, City 




this is the point at which Thomas drove the bus toward Armstead. Fearing for his life, the 
officer opened fire, hitting Thomas. He died the next day in the hospital of his wounds.110 
The escalation from a seemingly banal encounter with a police officer to a shooting echoed 
the Lynch, Grady, and Culbert cases. Just as in Grady’s case, Thomas was also accused of 
attempting to harm a police officer and thus the BPD argued the violence was justified. In all 
three of the previous police shootings the BBUF had become involved in, the perpetrating 
officer was white. In the Thomas case, however, the police officer was African American, 
further complicating ideas of who can commit acts of police brutality and murder.  
 Whatever the official news story and BPD accounts of the shooting of another 
unarmed Black man, the BBUF was determined to gather their own facts as they had in the 
past. In this case, there were three witnesses who were in the Volkswagen bus when Thomas 
was shot. Their stories did not mesh with the mainstream narratives and would lead the 
BBUF to again call for action from the city’s power structure. The three witnesses to 
Thomas’ shooting, Jerry Kelley. Robert Corry, and Michael Brook, gave BBUF investigators 
largely identical accounts of how the shooting transpired. Their story conflicted with the 
official narrative in a few key aspects. First, none of the three said that Thomas drove his 
Volkswagen bus at the officer. In fact, they claimed that Armstead had already gotten back in 
his car. It was only after Thomas blocked Armstead from driving off in order to write down 
his license plate that the officer came over to Thomas again. Second, all three witnesses 
testified to a disturbing degree of harassment from Armstead. As they remembered it, the 
officer was angry that Thomas was driving the wrong way down a one-way street and did not 
immediately show his license and registration to the non-uniformed officer. After Thomas’ 
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refusal to comply, the witnesses stated that Armstead held a gun to Thomas’ head. 
Furthermore, after shooting Thomas, Armstead ran to the other side of the van, and pulled 
out Corry at gunpoint.111 The escalation of this minor traffic infraction into the killing of an 
unarmed Black man is hard to fathom without attributing gross wrongdoing to the officer 
involved. 
 Based on the facts uncovered in their own investigation, the BBUF employed both of 
the strategies that they had used in the past to seek justice for Thomas. First, they went to the 
community with the evidence they had gathered. The community concluded that there 
needed to be an open inquest, that Armstead should be charged with murder, and that he 
should be suspended from the police force for the duration of the proceedings. Beyond the 
details specific to the Thomas case, the BBUF also demanded that Mayor White establish a 
community review board to investigate police violence and to appoint a new police 
commissioner who would be supportive of that effort.112  
Mayor White’s response to the BBUF’s demands was less than enthusiastic. On the 
matter of the investigation into the Thomas shooting, he replied that there was an ongoing 
inquest at the time of the BBUF’s demands and that the officer had been relieved of duty 
pending the results of said inquest. He disagreed, however, that any further action should be 
taken at that point. As for as the larger issues of reform raised by the BBUF, the mayor was 
strongly opposed to both a community review board or finding a new commissioner. His 
resistance to a community review board arose from his belief that the head of an 
organization, in this case the police department, should have full control over who is in his 
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employ. The issue of removing the police commissioner was glossed over by stating that his 
term had expired, but that he would be replaced when the mayor found someone else or he 
retired.113 From this response, it is apparent that Boston’s “progressive” Mayor White was 
not going to pursue meaningful change in the face of Thomas’ killing.  
The successes of the BBUF between 1970 and 1972 in getting justice for police 
killings were paired with bitter disappointments. Only Grady’s shooting garnered any 
favorable action from the city power structure. For the others, protests by the BBUF over the 
shootings were met with hostility or, at best, indifference by the courts, BPD, and City Hall. 
Rather, most of the BBUF’s success in getting justice for the victims of police violence came 
from within the Black community. In particular, Lynch’s case, and the protest that followed 
it, found strong support among Boston’s African Americans. It was in that instance that the 
BBUF was best able to muster the power of the community to form institutional alternatives 
to unjust white ones. At the same time, the publicity of the trial, conviction, and poster 
campaign against Officer Duggan raised awareness among the general public that injustices 
continued to be perpetrated against Black citizens by the police. The BBUF’s demands for 
police reform continue to reverberate into the present day with former Mayor Marty Walsh 
planning to create a civilian review board of police misconduct.114 
The shooting of Thomas, in particular, demonstrates the complications of solving 
racialized policing by simply hiring more Black officers. In Chicago in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Black officers were hired under the assumption that they would bring their experiences as 
Black Americans to policing and thus reduce the historic white supremacy rampant in the 
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police force. Evidence suggests, however, that sometimes even Black police officers thought 
that the solution to the problems plaguing their own communities was violence.115 This same 
problem emerged in the case of the BPD when Armstead killed Thomas over a minor traffic 
dispute. Although the BBUF took actions on this killing as well as three others, their holistic 
approach to the carceral state was a result of the recognition of the limitations of reforms like 
hiring more Black BPD officers. There was an entire power structure working against 
Boston’s Black community and other avenues were pursued to chip away at it piece-by-
piece. 
Black Judges 
 Shortly after the acquittal of Officer Duggan in the killing of Lynch, the BBUF would 
turn their attention to the matter of Black judges in the Massachusetts court system. This was 
not simply a matter of greater representation for the BBUF; it was a matter of life and justice. 
Like the BBUF, the BPP also doubted the ability of African Americans to receive fair trials 
in the court system. The difference between the two groups, though, was that the BBUF 
attempted to create changes through the power structure while the BPP directly challenged it. 
In 1968, BPP members rallied in Oakland to protest Huey Newton’s imprisonment for the 
killing of a police officer.116 Later, in 1970, protests against Bobby Seale’s murder trial 
directly challenged the legitimacy of the charges against him in the first place.117  
The BBUF’s methods were less confrontational than those of the BPP, but more 
systemically focused. Nonetheless, both challenged the legitimacy of a court system that 
excluded members of their community from positions that exercised power over Black lives. 
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Both cases also demonstrated the need to build Black political power, a goal that appeared 
more realistic in Boston as the black population rapidly grew in the 1960s. 
In an appeal to the governor of Massachusetts penned by BBUF leaders, State 
Representative Royal Bolling and City Councilor Tom Atkins, the United States Constitution 
was put forth as foundational to their belief that “a man should be judged by his peers.” 
Continuing, they wrote that the only way to achieve justice in the courts was to have judges 
who are “sensitive to and understanding of those whom they judge.”118 The message was 
clear and supported by elected officials from the community: Black people should be judged 
by Black judges.  
The Lynch case drove this point home for the letter’s authors, but also for all the 
people who supported Duggan’s conviction in the “Black People’s Court” and hung his 
“wanted” poster outside their homes and businesses. How could a police officer who shot 
and killed an unarmed Black man in a hospital (and who also accidentally killed another 
patient) face no legal consequences and retain his job? Viewing the entirety of the criminal 
justice system as rotten, the BBUF demanded not only change and oversight of the police 
department, but within the courts as well. This appeal received mainstream media coverage 
due to its support among prominent Black Bostonians.  
 The request that the governor appoint Black judges received immediate notice in the 
Boston Globe. On December 11, 1970, the newspaper noted that the BBUF was particularly 
interested in seeing the appointment of Black judges to a vacancy in Boston Municipal Court 
and to a chief clerkship in Dorchester District Court. As quoted in the article, Atkins and 
Bolling, coauthors of the letter written to the governor, disagreed over the chances of getting 
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Black judges appointed to these positions. Atkins thought that the governor would be 
receptive to their request and understood the urgent need for reform. Bolling, on the other 
hand, was not optimistic, and had heard that a deal had already been made to appoint a “non-
Black” person to the open clerkship. 119 This divide was reflective of the divide within the 
BBUF. Its leaders felt the need to continually press for reforms within the local and state 
justice systems, but also understood that racial biases and historical power imbalances were 
systemically stacked against them. 
 According to BBUF leadership, statistics proved that the Massachusetts court system 
reflected the biases that they associated with white judges overseeing cases involving Black 
people. Out of a total of 260 judges in the Commonwealth, only three were Black.120 These 
three judges were only slightly more than one percent of the total, and were not 
representative of Massachusetts’s African American population. In the estimation of the 
BBUF, were minorities to be properly represented in the judiciary, their number would 
comprise closer to ten percent of all judges.121 Furthermore, BBUF leadership protested the 
beginnings of mass incarceration which, according to them, followed from this disparity. 
BBUF leaders wrote to Governor Sargent that among the prison population, a growing 
number included African Americans far beyond their percentage in the general population.122 
Black citizens were becoming more entangled with the carceral state, and data supported that 
contention.  In their estimation, one piece of the puzzle for finding justice would involve 
putting their peers in judgeships in order to give Black defendants a shot at impartiality. 
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 Boston’s Black community, as in much of the action taken to address police 
shootings, was the foundation of support for the BBUF in the matter of judicial reform. A 
petition campaign was launched in order to show citizen support for “being judged by [one’s] 
peers.” These petitions were then sent to Governor Sargent to show the community’s support 
for the appointment of more Black and minority judges.123 Accompanying the petition was 
the argument from the BBUF that there were plenty of qualified African American lawyers 
who could be appointed to these positions.124 However, neither community support nor a 
qualified pool of candidates could persuade the governor to give the BBUF what they 
wanted. Throughout the early 1970s, journalists in the Boston Globe would continue to argue 
that Black judges made up a woefully inadequate percentage of the Massachusetts bench.125  
In the area of judicial reform, the BBUF were ahead of their time. The white power 
structure in Massachusetts was much slower to embrace the idea of the judiciary as a 
reflection of the population, at least as far as that sentiment was extended to the state’s 
African Americans. However, the recognition that the Black community was increasingly at 
the mercy of the criminal justice system was on the minds of BBUF leaders well before it 
was studied in depth and identified as part of the carceral state. It is in this sense that the 
BBUF’s activities with respect judicial reform can be considered successful. They were 
unable to change the makeup of Massachusetts’ courts through community-based actions, but 
in the realm of ideas they planted the seeds of changes advocated by future activists. 
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 Like the activism that followed police shootings of unarmed Black men in Boston, the 
BBUF’s Black Community Prison Committee pursued immediate, measurable goals while 
always keeping in mind the wider ranging societal changes that were their ultimate purpose. 
Conscious of the importance of both to the community, the committee released a statement of 
purpose, writing that: 
In working for prison “reform” it is important to recognize that “reform” is 
only a temporary measure. The cries all of the country for “reform” must 
not be allowed to confuse our real goal, that is, the destruction of the entire 
institution that permits wanton and unmitigated assault on human decency. 
Our efforts for “reform” are justified by the reality of a long and ardous 
[sic] struggle for destruction of the prison system. We must somehow make 
our concern meaningful to those who will not live to see our goal achieved. 
It is clear that our goal to free our brothers and sisters from the prisons is 
synonymous with the struggle to free ourselves from the claws of this 
decadent giant of a country.126 
 
Embracing this ethos in the early 1970s, the BBUF worked to change conditions in prison as 
well as for those who would soon finish their sentences. The Charles Street Jail, Deer Island 
Prison, and Norfolk Prison were the three correctional institutions where they focused their 
efforts. 
Other African American activist groups of the same era recognized the connections 
between urban poverty, the imprisonment of Black Americans, and the carceral state as well. 
Most famously, the BPP placed prison abolition in their 1966 Ten Point Program.127 
Prominent BPP members like Huey Newton, Eldridge Cleaver, Emory Douglas and others all 
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had personal brushes with the carceral system as youths and then again as adult activists.128 
On the receiving end of the United States’ shift from federal responsibility for welfare to the 
states, Black communities and activists became concerned by the increasing incarceration of 
Black men. From the perspective of those most likely to be imprisoned, it was not difficult to 
see the role that prisons played as inner cities sought to deal with poverty by imprisoning the 
most vulnerable. The BBUF similarly concerned themselves with this piece of the carceral 
state and had the inspiration of the BPP from a few years prior to help guide them to their 
ultimate aim of prison abolition. 
 The Charles Street Jail was the first piece of the Boston prison complex that the 
BBUF saw as ripe for reform. Built in 1848, by the early 1970s conditions in the jail were so 
deplorable that two commissions had called for its complete demolition and two others had 
called it inhumane. Nonetheless, the jail continued to hold approximately 300 prisoners 
awaiting trial.129 Attempting to improve conditions at the jail, the BBUF appealed to Suffolk 
County Sheriff Thomas Eisenstadt, the person in charge of the facility, but with little success. 
In an April 30, 1970 letter to Eisenstadt, the Prison Committee thanked him for his assistance 
with creating rules and regulations for inmates and personnel, something that had not 
previously existed at Charles Street, but lamented his unwillingness to meet with them to 
continue the work.130  
In a terse response on May 1, 1970, Eisenstadt offered to arrange a meeting between 
the committee and Master Edward V. Handwerk, an official at the jail.131 The committee did 
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meet with Handwerk on May 14, but had expected Eisenstadt to attend as well. The sheriff 
never showed up. Adding to the insult was the fact that Handwerk first denied knowing about 
the rules and regulations submitted by the committee. Later, upon reflection, Handwerk 
recalled the proposal, but said he knew nothing of its status within the sheriff’s office.132 This 
was the end of the BBUF’s first attempt at prison reform. While unsuccessful, this 
experience, as well as the one with Deer Island Prison, would inform the group’s tactics as 
they continued to work on other prison reform efforts. 
 Deer Island, a peninsula in Massachusetts Bay not far from Boston, served as a prison 
from Massachusetts’ colonial era until its demolition in 1991. In the twentieth century, the 
prison was known to be rat-infested and dirty. One member of the demolition team went so 
far as to equate conditions in the prison to those in a dungeon. Nonetheless, almost 1,000 
prisoners were living there at the time of the renovations.133 When the BBUF fought for 
reforms twenty years prior to this assessment, the conditions were the same. In fact, for Black 
prisoners, Deer Island was not only terrible physically, but run by a racist administration that 
deprived them of their rights. 
 On July 23, 1970, prisoners at Deer Island began a hunger strike to protest degrading 
physical and psychological conditions. According to Robert Jackson, then an inmate at the 
prison, they were peacefully protesting for better food, medical care, family visitation rights, 
and an end to the racism and exploitation exhibited by the prison administration. Urging the 
BBUF to form a committee to assist incarcerated African Americans, Jackson was looking 
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for an outside group that could advocate for their interests.134 Later that September, the group 
would meet with Dexter Eure of the Boston Globe, who urged the committee to expand their 
focus to all prisons, not just the one on Deer Island.135 The committee would go on to work 
on issues at Norfolk Prison and with soon to be released prisoners, but first they focused on 
Deer Island. 
 The actions that the BBUF Prison Committee took with respect to Deer Island 
continued the method they employed with the Charles Street Jail. Namely, appealing to the 
leadership of the prison’s administration. In the case of Deer Island, the BBUF again worked 
with Boston City Councilman Atkins, later a leader with the NAACP, to write an appeal to 
Commissioner Joseph McBrine of the Penal Institutions Department of the City of Boston. 
Atkins focused on the lack of jobs granted to Black prisoners during their incarceration, the 
racism of those in charge of the prison, abysmal sanitary conditions, and lack of adequate 
food. Strikingly, he noted, the accusation of racism had to be taken seriously because an 
estimated eighty-percent of the prison’s inmates were Black.136 There is no evidence that 
Deer Island changed its practices due to internal pressure from the prisoners or from the 
BBUF’s external efforts, but it would inform the group’s change in strategy at Norfolk and 
lead to their most successful effort at prison reform.  
 The conditions at Norfolk were not much different than the Charles Street Jail or Deer 
Island Prison. Inmates listed a diverse array of complaints regarding censorship, rule of law, 
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food, visitation, discipline, civil rights, education, work, medical care, and recreation.137 
Likely due to the failures they experienced in trying to work with the administrators of 
Charles Street and Deer Island, the BBUF employed a different tactic when working on 
reforms at Norfolk. This time, the Prison Committee worked directly with the Act 
Committee, a group formed by Norfolk inmates. At the June 23, 1971 meeting of the Prison 
Committee, the group agreed unanimously to work as an arm of the Act Committee to 
facilitate action in the community and communication on prison reform.138 After a year of 
trying to work through official channels, the BBUF was fed up with the absence of progress. 
 This change in tactics acknowledged the BBUF’s failure to work through official 
channels, but it presented a new path forward to find justice in the Massachusetts prison 
system. Seven months prior to the June 23 Prison Committee meeting, the BBUF started the 
Pre-Release Assistance Program. In a candid assessment of the program, the BBUF 
acknowledged a great deal of frustration, but listed successes in employment and housing for 
those recently released from Norfolk. Suggestions for building on these successes included 
supplying the recently incarcerated with behavioral services, hiring more Black and 
“Spanish” prison personnel, hiring more Black parole officers, allowing inmates to have job 
interviews prior to release, and, for those who would soon be paroled, allowing them outside 
of the prison during the day.139  
After two failed attempts at reform, the BBUF turned to the area where they had the 
power to act: Boston’s Black community. If they could not get prison administrations to 
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budge, they decided to work with prisoners at Norfolk through the Act Committee and give 
them hope once they were paroled. It is significant that the suggestions the Committee made 
to continue to improve inmates’ conditions were once again aimed at reforming Norfolk at 
the institutional level, rather than at the level of individual prisoners. This indicates that 
members of the Prison Committee understood the realities of the power dynamics they were 
facing, but continued to believe larger changes could be instituted at prisons in furtherance of 
the ultimate goal of prison abolition. 
The Community Security Agency 
 Unlike police shootings, judicial appointments, or prisons, BBUF efforts on security 
were focused entirely inward. Other BBUF reforms often tried to change institutions that 
affected the Black community—or at least gain concessions from them—but with the 
formation of the Community Security Agency (CSA), the BBUF took policing into their own 
hands. Community patrols were not unique to the BBUF, however, with discussions of street 
patrols occurring in California at least as early as 1966. Most famously, Huey Newton’s 
Black Panther Party (BPP) fielded armed patrolmen, but their primary purpose was to stop 
police violence. In contrast, the CSA’s purpose was to prevent street crime. Newton was also 
critical of earlier community patrols, specifically those in Watts, because they attempted to 
work with the police to some extent.140 The CSA, unlike the more militant BPP, made limited 
attempts to work with the BPD and therefore their efforts were more akin to the efforts in 
Watts than the insurgent model presented by the BPP. 
What the CSA lacked in formal legal recognition it made up for in support from 
Black businesses, non-profits, and citizens. The Urban League, Roxbury Multi-Service 
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Center, Roxbury Action Program, and Tenants’ Association of Boston were among the 
organizational members of the CSA whose representatives were interested in preventing 
“Black People committing crime against Black People.”141 Safety was paramount in these 
efforts, but there was also explicit recognition by BBUF leadership that there could be no 
economic growth within the Black community if crime was allowed to continue unabated.142 
In this way, the CSA brought together the radical and moderate wings of their coalition by 
combining community-based policing and the protection of Black businesses. The CSA not 
only put security patrols on the streets of Boston, but also gathered data on crime in the Black 
community. 
 The robbery of Unity Bank in December 1970, along with the murders of two 
security guards at Freedom Foods on August 14, 1971, were the catalysts that brought the 
CSA to fruition, but the problem of crime had been on community member’s minds for quite 
some time.143 Seventy-two people from the Black community were surveyed by the CSA and 
the results showed a community ravaged by crime and lacking trust in the police department. 
Twenty-five percent of the respondents’ houses had been robbed. At the same time, over 
forty percent of respondents did not think that calling white police officers would do any 
good. Finally, over ninety-four percent of those surveyed said that they would support a 
Black police force within the community—effectively endorsing the creation of the CSA.144  
To protect themselves, CSA members sat down with Black Boston police officers to 
learn the extent to which they could operate while not running afoul of the law. Topics 
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discussed at the August 10, 1971 meeting included how the officers could best serve the 
community and the differences between community and personal property rights.145 In this 
case, the BBUF attempted to liaise with the BPD, but limited their focus to Black officers 
only. This was consistent with the findings of the survey that found vast amounts of distrust 
with white police officers among Boston’s African Americans. It would be another six 
months until Cornell Thomas was shot by a Black Boston police officer, even eroding the 
Black community’s trust in Black officers. The police shootings prior to Thomas’ had 
already divided the community from the BPD, but, in those cases, the offending officer had 
been white. When Thomas was shot by a Black officer, the notion that more representation in 
the BPD would lead to systemic change was challenged. 
Beginning in 1970 and continuing into 1971, CSA patrols walked the streets of 
Jamaica Plain, Dudley, Columbia Point, and the South End, noting the racial make-up of the 
neighborhood and assessing security needs. According to some of these reports, it appears 
other community security services were already operating to some extent and that the CSA 
patrols acted as a liaison between them and the BBUF.146 This role was in keeping with the 
role of the BBUF as an “umbrella” organization that brought community members and 
groups together to act with common purpose. Fielding their own patrols, however, 
demonstrated their commitment to direct action as well. 
When it comes to security, success is hard to measure. The CSA’s patrols may have 
prevented crime, but there is rarely evidence of a crime that someone did not commit. 
Therefore, the BBUF’s security efforts alone cannot be considered either a resounding 
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success or an abject failure. Rather, they must be viewed in the larger context of all the 
criminal justice reforms that the BBUF undertook at the time. They were but one tool that the 
BBUF sought to use in their arsenal to find justice in a system that offered very little to Black 
people. While the CSA was operating, there was a large degree of support from Boston’s 
Black community, so much so that business owners, concerned citizens, politicians, and 
activists all contributed to it.147 
When contrasted with Fortner’s “Silent Majority,” the history of the CSA paints a 
drastically different picture of the Black community’s stance on crime—at least in Boston—
and the way that community members envisioned stopping it. In Fortner’s telling, the 
carceral state grew from Black Americans’ victimhood at the hands of criminals in their 
communities. Then, after experiencing rising crime in inner cities, it was African Americans 
who wanted more punitive measures and hence the rise of the carceral state.148 The history of 
the CSA shows that Black Bostonians were concerned with crime in their neighborhood. 
However, the narrative departs from Fortner’s analysis after that point.  
The BBUF and the residents of Roxbury, Mattapan, Dorchester, and the South End 
did not look to the state for a solution. Instead, they looked to their community’s ability to 
organize and operationalize security measures. When combined with the BBUF’s stance on 
prisons, it is apparent that not all Black communities favored the punitive approach that 
would continue to grow in coming decades, but that some actively worked against it. 
Moreover, it raises the question of whether a true majority actually wanted the punitive 
solutions that were handed down by the state. In the case of Boston, the answer was a 
resounding no. 
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 Police shootings, courts, prisons, and crime occupied the BBUF during their most 
active years in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Unlike prior activist groups in Boston, the 
BBUF was not focused on changing one aspect of a system they viewed as unjust. Instead, 
the BBUF focused on immediate issues like police violence against unarmed Black men and 
street crime as well as institutional sources of injustice like courts and prisons. Thus, their 
vision of reform and fairness on matters of crime was systemic. They were fighting 
immediate and long-term problems, but the goal was always a more just, and ultimately non-
existent, carceral state. At the same time, BBUF leadership understood what was possible 
and sought to accomplish what they could while looking toward the future. 









Capital flight, urban renewal, and migration drove the carceral turn in Massachusetts 
and Boston in the middle of the twentieth century. Combined with the long-standing racism 
of police, judges, prison wardens, and others in positions of power, Boston’s African 
Americans, like urban Black communities nationwide, were over-policed and under-
protected. This dual effect was not well understood by scholars and activists outside the 
community at the time. It seems contradictory that Boston’s Black population would have 
been unsafe when encounters with the carceral state were increasing, but because those 
encounters were often violent in the case of individual officers or unfair in the case of courts 
and prisons, distrust and fear developed. As crime rose within Boston’s Black community the 
BPD and the criminal justice system were viewed as a threat rather than a solution.  
Within this context, the history of the BBUF’s criminal justice activities offers new 
perspectives. For one, it shows that, for a time, Boston’s Black community was 
simultaneously concerned with Massachusetts’ carceral apparatus and the street crime that 
was plaguing their community. Most scholarship has focused on the institutions or social 
forces that led to the brutal policing and imprisonment of millions today. This has left out 
almost any accounting of what Black communities across the country did to try to stem the 
overwhelming tide of money and resources that were going into the carceral approach to 
managing society. Of course, Fortner does focus on the Black community, but largely to 
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show that the majority of Black Americans—at least in Harlem—favored the “tough on 
crime” approach that quickly became today’s carceral state.149 As the history of the BBUF 
establishes, this is not the whole picture. The BBUF’s example shows that their vision laid 
the groundwork for a form of justice that paired safety with freedom from state oppression.  
Another historical aspect of the BBUF that has been overlooked is community 
cohesion. From rallies against police violence to community patrols, the BBUF was able to 
engage community members across class and ideological lines. Much of the groundwork 
began in the early 1960s protest movements, but the BBUF channeled that energy toward 
criminal justice like no one had before. The unity that the BBUF was able to achieve over a 
sustained period reveals a shared understanding throughout the Black community that 
something needed to be done about the carceral apparatus and crime. Debates occurred 
within community meetings and committees about what exactly the operational aspects of 
this change would be, but there was widespread agreement about what needed to change. 
A third important aspect of the BBUF’s history is the confluence of economics and 
racism. While there is a debate in the literature over which drove the growth of the carceral 
state more, the history of the BBUF continues the conversation about how they are 
connected. Boston’s Black community was disproportionately affected by shifts in capital, 
construction, and demographics because of the long legacy of racism. In 1960s and 1970s 
Boston, a feedback loop between economic dislocation and racism occurred. Those who were 
most racially marginalized became the most economically marginalized. Economic 
vulnerability led to dislocation, which caused further fraying of the social fabric, and people 
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turned to crime out of desperation. The carceral state was then the white power structure’s 
solution to the problems of poverty and racism as the Keynesian era waned. 
Fourth, the BBUF’s use of media like posters, newspapers, newsletters, and word of 
mouth to spread news of injustice within the community and to organize resistance strategy 
prefigured the social media organizing and doxxing of today. Publishing Walter Duggan’s 
photograph, name, and address on posters after Franklin Lynch’s murder was an especially 
bold move that finds direct parallels with Black Lives Matter. The BBUF may have been 
trying to protect their community by warning people about dangerous officers, but they also 
may have been insinuating that someone should take justice into their own hands. Much like 
protesters who “out” white supremacists and violent police officers today, the BBUF were 
outing racist cops in the analog age.150 There is a fine line between vigilance and vigilantism 
that all protesters must straddle. Some may believe they went too far in Duggan’s case, but at 
the heart of the matter was that the BBUF understood that change rarely occurs when those 
who are oppressed remain silent. Using the tools available, they made their community’s 
anger felt in such a way that both Black and white Bostonians could no longer ignore 
problems of criminal justice. 
A fifth important aspect of the BBUF’s history of combatting the carceral state was 
their willingness to work both within relevant institutions and outside of them. To address 
police shootings of unarmed Black men, judgeships, and prisons, the BBUF tried to negotiate 
changes with the mayor, wardens, the governor, and other people in positions of power, often 
writing letters or requesting meetings. At the same time, however, the BBUF were realistic 
about the limits to which the white power structure would accommodate the Black 
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community’s demands for justice. After the police shootings in the early 1970s, the BBUF 
was willing to investigate, litigate, sentence, and protest what they and many in the Black 
community saw as grave injustices. Likewise, in the case of prisons, the BBUF worked 
directly with inmates to try to spur change. The CSA was an entirely community-driven 
enterprise that protected African American sections of Boston in lieu of police support. The 
dichotomous nature of action by the BBUF showed a strong sense of realism when 
confronting the carceral state and demonstrates that long-term changes required a 
multipronged approach. 
A final element of the BBUF’s approach that remains significant is their 
understanding of the systemic nature of the carceral state. This understanding extended not 
only to the interconnected elements of policing, the judiciary, prisons, and crime, but also to 
economics, politics, and quality of life. Leaders on the Security Committee made the 
connection between stopping robberies and killings and the ability of small businesses to 
thrive. The Pre-Release Assistance Program was another example of the link between the 
carceral state, prosperity, and, ultimately, freedom. The BBUF in the late 1960s and early 
1970s understood these connections and the need to address them systematically because 
they and their community lived them on a daily basis. 
At the same time, the history of the BBUF demonstrates the limits of a community-
based approach to systemic social problems. The BBUF regularly turned to Boston’s Black 
community for support because they were rebuffed by the white power structure. In the long-
term, however, this approach failed to stop police violence, mass incarceration, or street 
crime. It offered an alternative community-based model to the carceral state, but could only 
have been sustainable with support from federal and state governments. Without that support, 
95 
 
the problems of poverty were met with an increasing reliance on violent policing and 
increasing imprisonment, while crime continued unabated. 
Even though the carceral state continued to grow after the BBUF’s demise, the 
accomplishments of the group continued to bear fruit over the long-term. In 2004, Lenny 
Durant, a former BBUF leader, provided the Roxbury Community College Library Special 
Collections with an assessment of their original Twenty-One Demands, finding that in some 
form or fashion almost all had been achieved. Addressing demand three, that all police 
stations in the Black community should be overseen by Black captains, Durant writes that the 
two precincts in Black districts of Boston had achieved that goal.151 This shows that the 
BBUF were ahead of their time in their assessment of the carceral state as a growing 
problem. By making these demands, considered radical by the white power structure and 
even the NAACP, the BBUF planted seeds that over time became accepted as reasonable 
solutions to the carceral state. The slow, piecemeal achievement of many of the goals of the 
Twenty-One Demands has not changed Boston the way the BBUF envisioned, nor has it 
oriented Boston away from carceral solutions. Nonetheless, the legacy of their achievements 
has opened up spaces and conversations for new activism and organizing. 
The connections between contemporary activism around criminal and racial justice 
and the BBUF are clear. They are united across time in their opposition to the carceral state. 
What is different today is that many urban leaders are less equivocal in their support for 
police, judicial, and prison reform. Mayors in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Boston 
have all expressed solidarity with the goals of the BLM movement to a degree unheard of in 
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the late 1960s or 1970s.152 Some of this difference can be attributed to the greater diversity in 
city constituencies and leadership. Another part of increased scrutiny of the carceral state can 
be attributed to its sheer size. A final part can be attributed to groups that fought the carceral 
state early on. The BPP is the most famous example of resistance to police oppression, but 
the rich history of the BBUF’s activities show that it too is part of the legacy that has brought 
criminal justice reform into the American consciousness. As a significant part of Boston’s 
history, the BBUF’s legacy calls for a greater understanding among scholars and the general 
public. Their history is a crucial link that connects the civil rights and Black Power eras in 
Boston and reverberates in today’s ongoing protests against the carceral state. 
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